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For approximately forty-three days in early 2016, a very public and legally 
contentious dispute waged between Apple Inc. (“Apple”) and the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) regarding data encryption and privacy interests of electronic 
devices versus law enforcement and national security needs to search an iPhone.1 
Each party publicly, and through multiple court filings,2 argued their polar 
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1 Elizabeth Weise, Apple v FBI timeline: 43 days that rocked tech, USA TODAY (Mar. 15, 
2016, 6:26 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/15/apple-v-fbi-
timeline/81827400. 
 2 Id. Although numerous amicus briefs were filed, this Article primarily focuses on the 
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positions as to the validity of a court order, issued pursuant to the All Writs Act3 
(“AWA”), requiring Apple to provide technical assistance to allow the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to access the iPhone’s encrypted data. On one 
hand, the DOJ argued the court’s order was authorized and appropriate; on the 
other hand, Apple argued the court exceeded its authority when it ordered Apple 
to provide the described technical assistance in violation of statutory law, the 
separation of powers doctrine, and various provisions of the U.S. Constitution 
(“Constitution”). This ping-pong-like debate between the two parties made it 
difficult to determine what was truly required of Apple, whether it was legally 
appropriate, and who had the stronger legal position. In the end, the court 
vacated the order because the DOJ provided notice to the court that it had been 
able to access the iPhone.4 However, the issue of data encryption and privacy 
interests of electronic devices versus national security and law enforcement’s 
need to search electronic devices is still unresolved. This Article is an attempt to 
objectively examine and assess each party’s legal arguments concerning the 
court’s use of the AWA to order Apple to provide the technical assistance and 
identify any areas that may need further explanation before a final determination 
can be made.5 
 
I. THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE DOJ–APPLE DISPUTE 
On December 2, 2015, after pledging allegiance to Khalifa bu bkr al 
bhaghdadi al quraishi, a reference to Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, leader of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-sham (“ISIS”), Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife, 
Tafsheen Malik Farook (“Mali”), went to the Inland Regional Center (“IRC”), 
his place of employment, with two assault rifles and semiautomatic handguns.6 
                                                          
parties’ court-filed documents. 
 3 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2015). 
 4 Order Vacating February 16, 2016 Order at 1, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone 
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California 
License Plate #[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Final 
Order]. 
 5 As there was no final court decision on the legal dispute before the court, this Article 
is based upon Apple Inc.’s (Apple’s) and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) court-filed 
documents and publicly available information. 
 6 Gov’t’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Declaration of Christopher Pluhar; Exhibt 
Memo at 2, In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a 
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Application]; Declaration of Christopher Pluhar at 2, 
In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 16-
10) [hereinafter Pluhar Declaration]. 
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They walked into a conference room where his co-workers were attending a 
holiday luncheon/training session, and opened-fire, killing 14 people and 
injuring 22 others.7 Malik and Farook were killed later that day in a shoot-out 
with law enforcement. 
At the time, the December 2, 2015 attack was “the deadliest Islamic State-
inspired attack on American soil,”8 resulting in an FBI investigation. By 
December 3, 2015, the FBI had obtained a Search and Seizure Warrant, based 
upon probable cause, from Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow authorizing the 
FBI to search and seize a “Black Lexus IS300 California license plate 
#5KGD203, [35KGD203] . . . vehicle identification number 
JTHBD192X50094434” and various items found in the vehicle to include digital 
devices.9 The subsequent FBI search located an Apple digital device, 
specifically an “iPhone 5C, Model: A1532, P/N: MGFG2LL/A, S/N: 
FFMNQ3MTG2DJ, IMEI: 358820052301412, on the Verizon Network”10 
(“Device”). 
Farook’s employer, the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health 
(“SBCDPH”), owned the Device and provided it to him for business purposes. 
While the SBCDPH gave the FBI permission to search the iPhone (and 
permission for Apple’s technical assistance), the Device was passcode protected 
and the SBCDPH did not know the passcode.11 The SBCDPH also owned the 
Device’s corresponding iCloud account, and even though the SBCDPH did not 
know the iCloud account password, it had the ability to reset the password.12 
According to FBI Supervisory Special Agent (“SSA”) Christopher Pluhar, the 
FBI found the Device powered off inside of the vehicle. When the Device was 
                                                          
 7 Application, supra note 6; Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6. 
 8 Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino Attack as 
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/ 
tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html. 
 9 Application, supra note 6, at 1 (The majority of the court-filed documents have 
“35KGD203” as the license plate number versus “#5KGD203.” Although it cannot be 
conclusively determined, this appears to be a typographical error, with the inadvertent use of 
the shift key when typing the number “3”.). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Gov’t’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s February 16, 2016 
Order Compelling Assistance in Search; Exhibit at 18 n. 7, In re Matter of the Search of an 
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, 
California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter 
Motion to Compel]; Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6, at 3. 
 12 Motion to Compel, supra note 11; Supplemental Declaration of Christopher Pluhar in 
Support of Gov’t’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s 
Motion to Vacate Order at 1-2, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the 
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 
35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Pluhar Supplemental 
Declaration]. 
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powered on, it displayed a four-digit pad (indicating a four-digit passcode) and 
was running iOS9, an operating system for Apple’s mobile devices.13 Although 
the SBCDPH had deployed the mobile device management system (“MDM”) to 
manage its employee-issued iPhones, the MDM system had not been fully 
implemented at the time and so was not yet installed on Farook’s Device.14 The 
MDM system would have enabled the SBCDPH to “enroll iOS devices in an 
enterprise environment, wirelessly configure and update settings, monitor 
compliance with corporate policies, and even remotely wipe or lock managed 
devices.”15 Thus, had the MDM been implemented on his Device, the SBCDPH 
would have had the ability to clear the passcode and unlock the iPhone.16 
The FBI faced numerous issues related to the examination of the Device. First, 
the FBI did not know or have access to the passcode.17 Not only was the FBI 
faced with a large iteration count, it also had to manually, rather than 
electronically, enter the passcodes.18 In addition, Apple’s iPhone operating 
system (“iOS”) allowed the user to implement an “‘auto-erase function’ that 
would, if enabled, result in the permanent destruction of the required encryption 
key material after ten erroneous attempts at the passcode.”19 The FBI had reason 
to believe the function was enabled as the SBCDPH stated the Device had been 
provided to Farook with the function enabled. In addition, the most recent 
examination of the device’s corresponding iCloud account indicated the auto-
erase function was enabled.20 Thus, the FBI concluded it risked permanent 
inaccessibility to the data in the iPhone after ten erroneous passcode attempts as 
the auto-erase function would erase the encryption key needed to access the 
encrypted data.21 
Given these concerns and the impact to its ability to access the data, the FBI 
                                                          
 13 Gov’t’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s 
Motion to Vacate Order at 1-2, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the 
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 
#[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Opposition]; Pluhar 
Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12. 
 14 Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12. 
 15 iOS Security, iOS9.0 or later, APPLE INC. 1, 52 (Sept. 2015). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Application, supra note 6, at 3. 
 18 A large iteration count makes each passcode attempt slower. As a result, “it would 
take years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode.” Id. at 5.; 
Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6, at 3; Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling 
Apple Inc. to Assist Agency in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel 
Assistance at 6, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a 
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 25, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Motion to Vacate]. 
 19 Application, supra note 6, at 3. 
 20 Id. at 6. 
 21 Id. 
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sought Apple’s technical assistance to disable certain non-encrypted security 
features within the device’s operating system.22 The FBI first sought Apple’s 
voluntary technical assistance, which was provided on a limited basis; however, 
Apple denied the FBI’s request to disable various non-encrypted security 
features23 and/or refused to discuss disabling the non-encryption security 
features24 which led to this public and legally contentious dispute between Apple 
and the DOJ. 
A. Timeline of the Parties’ Court-Filed Documents 
Subsequent to Apple’s denial to voluntarily disable the non-encryption 
features, the DOJ filed the Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order 
Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search (“Application”) on February 
16, 2016 with the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California. The Application included SSA Pluhar’s Declaration and the court-
issued search warrant relied upon by the FBI. The Application requested the 
court to order Apple, pursuant to the AWA,25 to provide technical assistance to 
the FBI to access the Device’s encrypted data.26 
That same day, Magistrate Judge Sherri Pym signed the Order Compelling 
Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search (“Order”). The Order required Apple to 
provide reasonable technical assistance such that it would accomplish the 
following: 
(1) Disable the auto-erase function whether it was enabled or not; 
(2) Allow the FBI to electronically submit passcodes (via some other 
physical device port, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or any other protocol 
available on the device); and 
(3) Permit the FBI to enter passcodes in a manner such that the 
software would not intentionally add delay times between passcodes 
attempts beyond that which is incurred by Apple hardware.27 
 
The Order also included the DOJ’s proposed course of action demanding Apple 
provide the FBI a custom signed iPhone Software (“IPSW”) file, and a recovery 
bundle or some other Software Image File (“SIF”) that could be loaded on the 
                                                          
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 5. 
 24 Opposition, supra note 13, at 21. 
 25 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2015). 
 26 Application, supra note 6, at 1. 
 27 Order Compelling Apple, Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 2, In re the Search of an 
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, 
California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 15-0451M) [hereinafter 
Order]. 
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device. The SIF would load and run from Random Access Memory (“RAM”) so 
that the device would remain forensically sound. Per the DOJ, because the SIF 
would create a unique identifier, it would only load and run on the device. The 
SIF would bypass the auto-erase function; allow the FBI to input passcodes 
electronically; and remove various time delays.28 The SIF could be installed at 
a government facility or an Apple facility; however, a government representative 
would electronically enter the passcodes.29 Apple was ordered to provide the 
DOJ Apple’s reasonable costs for the technical assistance.30 Finally, the Order 
gave Apple the flexibility to develop other options for achieving the FBI’s stated 
goals, subject to the DOJ’s agreement.31 
In response to the Order, Tim Cook, Apple’s Chief Executive Officer, 
published an on-line notice entitled, A Message to Our Customers (“Message”) 
where Apple indicated it would legally challenge the Order’s validity, and 
outlined its policy reasons for challenging the United States Governments 
(“Government’s”) actions.32 
On February 19, 2016, the DOJ filed the Government’s Motion to Compel 
Apple Inc. to Comply with this Court’s February 16, 2016 Order Compelling 
Assistance in Search (“Motion to Compel”).33 Apple’s Message was an exhibit 
to the Motion to Compel. Then, on February 25, 2016, Apple filed Apple Inc.’s 
Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search and 
Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance (“Motion to 
Vacate”).34 Apple also filed two Declarations, one signed by Erik 
Neuenschwander, Manager of User Privacy,35 and one signed by Lisa Olle, 
Manager of Global Privacy & Law Enforcement Compliance Team.36 
                                                          
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 2-3. 
 30 Id. at 3. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE INC. (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter. 
 33 Weise, supra note 1. 
 34 Id. 
 35 As the manager of User Privacy, Erik Neuenschwander is “responsible for the privacy 
design of Apple’s products and services” and provides many of the technical details about 
the Device. See Declaration of Erik Neuenschwander in Support of Apple’s Motion to 
Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, and Opposition to 
Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 3-4, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone 
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California 
License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter 
Neuenschwander Declaration]. 
 36 Lisa Olle is responsible for Apple’s compliance with legal requests from 
international, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies; she was also responsible for 
Apple’s response to the legal requests for information concerning the Device at issue. See 
Declaration of Lisa Olle in Support of Apple’s Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling 
Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search and Opposition to Gov’t’s Motion to Compel 
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In response to the Motion to Vacate, the DOJ filed the Government’s Reply 
in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to 
Vacate Order (“Opposition”).37 The DOJ attached Declarations to the 
Opposition signed by SSA Pluhar,38 Stacey Perino (a FBI Electronics 
Engineer),39 and Assistant U.S. Attorney Tracy Wilkison (concerning accuracy 
of DOJ’s submitted exhibits).40 
On March 15, 2016, Apple filed Apple Inc.’s Reply to Government’s 
Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to 
Asist Agents in Search (“Reply”).41 Apple also filed additional Declarations 
signed by Nicola Hanna (concerning accuracy of Apple’s submitted exhibits),42 
Craig Federighi, Senior Vice President of Software Engineering, Robert 
Ferrini,43 Senior Director of Worldwide Advertising & Planning, and Erik 
Neuenschwander.44 
B. Issues Presented in the DOJ- Apple Litigation 
After reviewing the court-filed documents, it is reasonable to assume that the 
DOJ did not foresee the issues that would arise in this case, including the court’s 
authority to issue the Order pursuant to the AWA. However, Apple raised a 
number of complex, and to an extent, overlapping issues. Between the parties’ 
respective positions outlined in the court documents, the dispute presents the 
                                                          
Assistance at 2, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a 
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. 
Feb. 25, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter Olle Declaration]. 
 37 Weise, supra note 1. 
 38 Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 1. 
 39 Declaration of Stacey Perino in Support of Gov’t’s Reply in Support of Motion to 
Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order at 1, In re the Search of an 
Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, 
California License Plate #[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter 
Perino Declaration]. 
 40 Supplemental Declaration of Tracy Wilkinson in Support of Gov’t’s Reply in Support 
of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order at 1, In re the 
Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black 
Lexus IS300, California License Plate #[3]5KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 16-10) 
[hereinafter Wilkinson Supplemental Declaration]. 
 41 Weise, supra note 1. 
 42 Apple Inc.’s Reply to Government’s Opposition to Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate 
Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search at 1-2, In re the Search of an Apple 
iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, 
California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2016) (No. 16-10) [hereinafter 
Reply]. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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following issues: 
(1) Does this case pertain to a single iPhone or all iPhones? 
(2) Does the Order compel Apple to create a universal master key or 
back door or require Apple to hack its own customers? 
(3) Did the court exceed its jurisdictional authority when it issued the 
Order pursuant the AWA? 
(4) Did the court appropriately use the AWA when it ordered Apple 
to provide the mandated technical assistance? 
(5) Does the Order violate Apple’s First Amendment rights? 
(6) Does the Order implicate anyone’s Fourth Amendments rights? 
(7) Does the Order violate an individual’s or individuals’ right to 
privacy? 
(8) Does the Order violate Apple’s Fifth Amendment rights? 
However, before examining these issues, one must first have an understanding 
of Apple’s iOS, including aspects of its architectural hardware, software and 
data encryption, and non-encryption security features. 
II. APPLE’S IOS9.0 SECURITY GUIDE 
The Device in this case operated on iOS9.0, Apple’s iOS Security, iOS9.0 or 
later45 guidebook (“iOS9.0 Security Guide”) will be used as a reference of the 
device’s encryption and non-encryption security features.46 Based upon the 
review of Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide, it is clear Apple is extremely 
concerned with the security lifecycle of all of its manufactured devices. Apple 
states, “[e]very iOS device combines software, hardware, and services [that are] 
designed to work together for maximum security . . . iOS protects not only the 
device and its data at rest, but the entire ecosystem, including everything users 
do locally, on networks, and with key Internet services.”47 The encryption and 
non-encryption security features built into all levels of Apple’s devices, e.g., the 
hardware, firmware, software, processes, updates, apps, etc. are consistent with 
Apple’s mission to protect its users’ privacy. 
A. Some of Apple’s Encryption and Non-Encryption Security Features 
One of Apple’s encryption features, “Data Protection,” is designed to protect 
data stored in the flash memory of the iPhone48 which ensures a high level of 
                                                          
 45 iOS9.0 Security Guide, APPLE INC. 1, 1 (2015). 
 46 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18 (beginning with iOS8, Apple began to incorporate 
passcodes into its encryption systems). 
 47 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 4. 
 48 See Jeff Tyson, How Flash Memory Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://computer. 
howstuffworks.com/flash-memory.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (explaining data is 
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encryption of the user’s data. When the user sets up the iPhone’s passcode, the 
Data Protection encryption feature is automatically enabled, and the user’s data, 
including the user’s Messages, Mail, Calendar, Contacts, Photos, Health Data 
are automatically encrypted.49 The data is encrypted through a combination of a 
user-determined passcode (either a four to six numeric combination or a six 
alphanumeric combination) and a unique 256-bit Advanced Encryption 
Standard (“AES”) key, referred to as the Unique ID (“UID”). The UID/AES 
256-bit key is fused into an iPhone during its manufacture and neither Apple nor 
its suppliers know the UID/AES 256-bit key nor can the iPhones’ software or 
firmware read the UID.50 Upon set up, the user’s passcode becomes entangled 
with the iPhone’s UID; thus the stronger the passcode, the stronger the 
encryption key.51 Finally, because the passcode becomes entangled with the 
UID, brute force attempts can only be manually entered into the iPhone.52 
One of Apple’s non-encryption security features, the large iteration count, 
also discourages brute force attempts on iOS9.0 as each subsequent passcode 
entered into the device is slowed, ensuring that it would take five to six years to 
try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode (using upper and 
lower case letters).  The iteration count is calibrated so that one attempt takes 
approximately 80 milliseconds. As a result of the increased computational 
burden after each unsuccessful attempt, each subsequent passcode entry to 
access the iPhone becomes slower as the computational burden for each entry is 
increased after each attempt.53 
Another non-encryption security feature which discourages brute force 
attempts is escalating time delays between incorrect passcode entries.  For the 
first four attempts, there would be no time delay; however, for the fifth attempt 
there would be a 1-minute delay, for the sixth attempt, a 5-minute delay, for the 
seventh and eighth attempt, a 15-minute delay, and a 1-hour delay after the ninth 
attempt.54 In addition, after a certain number of incorrect attempts, the time delay 
is set to an infinite value that results in the device not accepting any more 
                                                          
stored electronically as opposed to being stored in a computer hard drive). 
 49 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 11-12. 
 50 See id. at 10-12; Motion to Vacate, supra note 18; Pluhar Declaration, supra note 6, 
at 5. 
 51 See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Motion to Vacate, supra 
note 18, at 6; Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 35. 
 52 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Neuenschwander Declaration, 
supra note 35. 
 53 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18; see also Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 
35. 
 54 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Neuenschwander Declaration, 
supra note 35, at 6. 
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passcodes, thereby making the data permanently inaccessible.55 
Finally, Apple has installed an auto-erase feature, called “Erase Data,” which 
if activated would delete encrypted data after ten consecutive, incorrect passcode 
entries.56  This setting is also available as an administrative policy through the 
MDM.57 
B. Other Hardware and Software System Security Features 
According to Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide, everything within Apple’s iOS 
is designed to ensure only authorized/signed Apple products, processes, code, 
devices etc. can operate on Apple’s iOS. From the initial booting of the device 
(e.g. beginning with the Apple root certificate) to software upgrades to apps 
loaded on the device, there is some level of verification and/or trust certification 
to ensure the security of the electronic device. Because only Apple products can 
run Apple’s iOS and only Apple-signed code can run on Apple devices, only 
Apple can prevent any downgrading to an iOS through a process called System 
Software Authorization.58 
Apple is able to prevent the downgrading of its iOS through the procedures 
required for updates to its devices. For example, during an iOS update, the 
device will connect to an “Apple installation authorization server and sends it a 
list of cryptographic measurements for each part of the installation bundle to be 
installed (for example, LLB, iBoot, the kernel, and OS image), a random anti-
reply value (nonce), and the device’s unique ID ECID.”59 It is important to note 
the unique ID ECID is different from the UID, the 256-bit AES Key. The ECID 
is a 64-bit AES key tied to a particular model60 (e.g. an iPhone model) while the 
256-bit AES Key is particular to each individual device. To prevent the 
downgrade, Apple’s authorization server will check: 
the presented list of measurements against versions for which 
installation is permitted and, if it finds a match, adds the ECID to the 
measurement and signs the results. The server passes a complete set 
of signed data to the device as part of the upgrade process. Adding 
the ECID ‘personalizes’ the authorization for the requesting device . 
. . These steps ensure that the authorization is for a specific device 
and that an old iOS version form one device can’t be copied to 
                                                          
 55 Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 35, at 4. 
 56 See Motion to Vacate, supra note 18 (stating the position of the DOJ that it deletes 
the encryption key making the data inaccessible). 
 57 iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 12; see also Neuenschwander Declaration, 
supra note 35, at 4. 
 58 iOS Security, iOS9.0 or later, supra note 15, at 6. 
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 60 Id. at 58. 
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another.  The nonce prevents an attacker from saving the server’s 
response and using it to tamper with a device or otherwise alter the 
software system.61 
Overall, Apple and the DOJ agree upon the fundamental encryption and non-
encryption security features articulated in Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide. Apple 
and the DOJ also agree on the following matters regarding the impact the trust 
certification steps have on iPhones: only Apple devices can run Apple’s iOS; 
only Apple-signed code can run on Apple devices; and one cannot downgrade 
the iOS. The parties are in disagreement over the Order’s impact to Apple’s iOS 
and whether those changes are personalized to only one device.62 
III. DOES THIS CASE PERTAIN TO A SINGLE IPHONE OR ALL 
IPHONES? 
The DOJ consistently argues this case is about a single iPhone and that it is 
the iPhone specifically described in the Order. Apple strongly disagrees with the 
DOJ’s position. In fact, Apple’s first sentence in its Motion to Vacate is “[t]his 
is not a case about one isolated iPhone.”63 Apple consistently argues what the 
government is mandating through the Order will significantly impact millions 
of Apple iPhones. Which party is correct? The answer is both, depending on 
one’s perspective; however, while each perspective may be reasonable, one must 
examine that perspective according to the law in order to determine its validity. 
A. DOJ’s Position–It is About One, Single iPhone 
Through the Order filed pursuant to the AWA and the government’s 
Application, the DOJ informed the court that the FBI had obtained a specific 
device via a valid search warrant.64 The Application also informed the court that 
although Apple had provided some assistance to the FBI (e.g., complied with 
valid subpoenas for account information, participated in telephone calls), Apple 
declined to voluntarily assist them in disabling various security features, 
resulting in its need for the Order. As written, the Application pertains to a single 
Apple iPhone, specifically, “iPhone 5C, Model: A1532, P/N: MGFG2LL/A, 
S/N: FFMNQ3MTG2DJ, IMEI: 358820052301412, on the Verizon Network”65 
On February 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym signed the Order directing 
                                                          
 61 Id. at 6. 
 62 See infra text accompany notes 111–126; see also Perino Declaration, supra note 39, 
at 17-30. 
 63 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 1. 
 64 Final Order, supra note 4, at 1. 
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Apple to provide the FBI technical assistance, as described in the Order,66 for 
one phone, identified as “a cellular telephone, Apple make: iPhone 5C, Model: 
A1532, P/N: MGFG2LL/A, S/N: FFMNQ3MTG2DJ, 
IMEI: 358820052301412, on the Verizon Network.”67 Thus, given the specific 
wording of the Application and Order, the DOJ’s perspective is reasonable. 
The same day the Order was signed, Apple issued its Message68 outlining 
Apple’s objections to the Order. Although only a DOJ exhibit, the message 
foretells Apple’s future legal arguments that the Order would affect the privacy 
and security of millions of iPhones users and the Government was requiring it 
to create a backdoor and/or something equivalent to a master key.69 
On February 19, 2016, the DOJ filed its Motion to Compel given Apple’s 
“stated interest in adversarial testing of the order’s legal merits, [and] . . . to 
provide Apple with the due process and adversarial testing it seeks.”70 In its 
Motion to Compel, the DOJ repeats many of its arguments outlined in its 
Application, primarily focusing on how the requirements of the AWA are met. 
The DOJ summarizes its single, isolated iPhone argument as 
the Order is tailored for and limited to this particular phone. And the 
Order will facilitate only the FBI’s efforts to search the phone; it does 
not require Apple to conduct the search or access any content on the 
phone. Nor is compliance with the Order a threat to other users of 
Apple products. Apple may maintain custody of the software, destroy 
it after its purpose under the Order has been served, refuse to 
disseminate it outside of Apple, and make clear to the world that it 
does not apply to other devices or users without lawful court orders. 
As such, compliance with the Order presents no danger for any other 
phone.71 
As to Apple’s public position, the Order requires Apple to write code to create 
a backdoor, a master key or hack its own customers. The DOJ simply denies 
these allegations.72 
                                                          
 66 See supra text accompany notes 26-31. 
 67 Gov’t’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in 
Search at 1, In re the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search 
Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 
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 68 Cook, supra note 32. 
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B. Apple’s Position—It is About Millions of iPhones 
On February 25, 2016, Apple responded to the DOJ’s Motion to Compel with 
its Motion to Vacate, and its first sentence was “[t]his is not a case about one 
isolated iPhone.”73 Apple views this case as law enforcement and national 
security interests versus all iPhone users’ privacy and security interests.74 And, 
because the privacy and security interests of all iPhone users are at stake, this 
case is about millions of iPhones. Apple cites numerous articles and statements 
where other government attorneys have filed applications for similar orders in 
various jurisdictions. Additionally, Apple cites state and local officials who have 
publicly stated they intend to follow similar procedures to search hundreds of 
seized iPhones obtained through standard law enforcement investigations, as 
opposed to only terrorism cases.75 
Apple’s perspective is reasonable. In fact, if the Order is determined to be 
valid under the AWA, one could anticipate law enforcement agencies pursuing 
this same avenue of assistance in the future. Although Apple’s position is 
reasonable, this case’s impact is no different from any other case that would 
impact future prosecutions and decisions. And, each future individual request 
for an AWA order would still require judicial supervision and while the initial 
order may be issued ex parte, that entity will also have the ability to challenge 
that order in any future case. In addition, if the underlying order is supported 
with a court-ordered, probable cause search warrant, there are at least two levels 
of judicial oversight of the government’s actions. 
C. DOJ’s Opposition and Apple’s Reply 
In its March 10, 2016, Opposition, the DOJ repeated many of its arguments. 
The Order applies to a single iPhone, which provides flexibility for Apple; it 
does not compel Apple to unlock other iPhones, nor create a backdoor or a 
master key.76 In fact, it requires only the development of “a narrow, targeted 
piece of software capable of running on just one iPhone, in the security of 
Apple’s corporate headquarters.”77 In Apple’s March 15, 2016 Reply, Apple 
again argued the case is not about one, single iPhone nor is it modest given the 
potential impact on other iPhones.78 
In both its Motion to Vacate and its Reply, Apple argues that if the 
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Government requires this information through a court order, it is only a matter 
of time before foreign governments require the same assistance from Apple. 
Alternatively, the DOJ contends if Apple chooses to do business in another 
country, it voluntarily agrees to comply with that country’s laws.79 Both parties 
have reasonable positions. However, Apple appears to inconsistently defend the 
privacy and security of its clients depending on the country of its users. Apple’s 
iOS9.0 Security Guide demonstrates Apple’s commitment to privacy and 
security of its devices. Apple’s own website also posts its belief that “privacy is 
a fundamental human right.”80 However, Apple has a unique way of protecting 
privacy and security interests in China when it places all the data on a server 
operated by a government-owned company, China Telecom.81 Apple responds 
to the DOJ’s argument with the following: 
Apple has never built a back door of any kind into iOS, or otherwise 
made data stored on the iPhone or in iCloud more technically 
accessible to any country’s government.  The government is wrong 
in asserting that Apple made ‘special accommodations’ for China, as 
Apple uses the same security protocols everywhere in the world and 
follows the same standards for responding to law enforcement 
requests.82 
Most attorneys will agree words are important. Therefore, one must examine 
Apple’s word choice of “more technically accessible.”83 This does not mean the 
Chinese government does not have access to the data on the server. Many are 
also skeptical of Apple’s privacy position in China.84 In addition, while Apple 
                                                          
 79 Opposition, supra note 13, at 26. 
 80 Apple products are designed to protect your privacy, APPLE, INC., 
https://www.apple.com/privacy (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). 
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may follow Apple’s standards for processing all law enforcement requests, not 
all country judicial standards for issuing orders to access one’s iPhone are the 
same.85 Therefore, Apple may have never “made data stored on the iPhone or in 
iCloud more technically accessible,” one cannot simply conclude a foreign 
government does not have access to data stored on the iPhone, or in iCloud.86 
Overall, each party’s position is reasonable; however, the DOJ has the 
stronger legal position as the Order applies to the single iPhone described in the 
Order. While Apple’s position is reasonable, the fact that a particular case may 
impact other cases is not an earthshattering legal concept to attorneys. Each 
future case would still only be decided on the facts presented in that specific case 
and not on hypotheticals.87 For there is “[n]o principle . . . more fundamental to 
the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional 
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”88 It is 
also logical that if this Order is determined to be valid under the AWA, other 
applications would be made in the future. However, the issuance of a future order 
via the AWA would still be subject to judicial scrutiny and the opportunity to 
challenge that particular order would still exist. 
IV. DOES THE ORDER COMPEL APPLE TO CREATE A BACKDOOR, A 
MASTER KEY OR SOMETHING EQUIVALENT TO A MASTER KEY, 
AND IF SO, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS? 
The DOJ and Apple have polar answers as to whether Apple is required to 
create a backdoor. Apple argues the Order requires it to create a backdoor or 
something equivalent to a master key to its iOS. As firmly as Apple is set in its 
position, so is the DOJ in its belief that Apple is not required to create a backdoor 
and/or master key. What is interesting about each party’s position is that neither 
entity provides a definition for a backdoor, nor a master key in their respective 
motions, and appear to argue from each party’s own understanding of the terms 
but not conclusively known to the other.89 
In attempting to answer the question presented, the definitions of the terms 
                                                          
technology/la-fi-apple-china-20160226-story.html; Heather Timmons, Apple is reportedly 
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 87 See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 412 (2013). 
 88 See id. at 408. 
 89 See generally Motion to Compel, supra note 11; Motion to Vacate, supra note 18. 
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required in order to determine the Order’s impact to Apple’s iOS should be 
considered. However, there does not seem to be a universally accepted definition 
of backdoor in the digital world. In fact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence does not even have a definition 
for backdoor.90 Rather, there are various definitions of backdoor which have 
developed over time,91 with a common understanding that a backdoor in the 
digital world describes the means of bypassing a computer system’s security 
protocols in order to access the computer system.92 
The term master key seems to have a more accepted definition. For example, 
the Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security defines master key as a 
cryptographic key “whose sole purpose is to protect other keys.”93 Its application 
is a 
cryptographic key (typically a symmetric key) . . . whose sole 
purpose is to protect other keys, such as session keys, while those 
keys are in storage, in use, or in transit. This protection may take one 
of two forms: the master keys, may be used to encrypt the other keys, 
or the master key may be used to generate other keys.94 
Thus, the question presented becomes whether Apple’s modifications to iOS 
(what Apple calls Gov’s95 and the DOJ calls SIF96) allow the DOJ the ability to 
access the encrypted data on this one, single iPhone through a backdoor and/or 
equivalent to a master key for all other iPhones (requiring no changes to 
GovtOS/SIF); or would the new GovtOS/SIF have to be modified to unlock 
another iPhone, be it the same model or different models, and what is the extent 
                                                          
 90 See Kim Zetter, HACKER LEXICON: WHAT IS A BACKDOOR?, WIRED (Dec. 11, 
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of those modifications? If those modifications are minor, is this two steps away 
from a backdoor or “equivalent to a master key?”97 
A. DOJ’s Position–There Is No Mandate to Create a Backdoor or a Master Key 
The DOJ preemptively filed its Motion To Compel given Apple’s public 
position that it would legally challenge the Order.98 In its motion, the DOJ 
repeats many of its arguments outlined in its Application. The primary focus of 
this motion is how the requirements authorizing third party assistance via the 
AWA, which are outlined in United States v. New York. Telephone Co.99 (“N.Y. 
Telephone Co.”), have been met. The DOJ strongly denies Apple’s allegation 
that the Order requires Apple to write code to create a backdoor or a master key, 
or hack its own customers. More specifically, the DOJ argues the Order does not 
provide hackers and criminals access to all iPhones, nor does it require Apple to 
search or access the device or hack or decrypt its customers’ iPhones. It also 
does not compromise the security of personal information of Apple products; 
and “does not give the government ‘the power to reach into anyone’s device’ 
without a warrant or court authorization . . . [nor] does [it] compromise the 
security of personal information.”100 The Order allows Apple to maintain or 
destroy GovtOS/SIF (for the Government never needs to possess 
GovtOS/SIF),101 and gives Apple flexibility to develop other options. In sum, 
“compliance with the Order presents no danger for any other phone and is not 
‘the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions or 
locks.’”102 
While the DOJ denies Apple’s allegations in its motion, the DOJ fails to 
provide an explanation as to how the newly written code to disable the non-
encryption security features is not a backdoor or a master key to Apple’s iOS. 
At this point in the litigation, this is a flaw in the DOJ’s position and one that 
must be addressed in this case and in future cases. 
                                                          
 97 Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 14; Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 7. 
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B. Apple’s Position–It is a Mandate to Create a Backdoor and/or a Master Key 
In its Motion to Vacate, Apple argues “[t]he government demands that Apple 
create a back door to defeat the encryption on the iPhone”103 and “[t]he order 
demanded by the government compels Apple to create a new operating system—
effectively a ‘back door’ to the iPhone—that Apple believes is too dangerous to 
build.”104 The focus is on Apple’s choice of words to describe the Government’s 
actions, e.g. requiring it to create a backdoor,105 effectively create a backdoor,106 
or something equivalent to a master key.107 However, because Apple does not 
provide a definition of backdoor or master key, one cannot conclusively evaluate 
its position. In addition, Apple’s use of phrases “effectively create a back door” 
or “equivalent to a master key,” gives Apple flexibility to maneuver around the 
terms “backdoor” and “master key”. In other words, Apple is not required to 
meet a definition, yet may still obtain the benefits of the negative inference of 
the terms. 
Apple also argues that it not only needs to write new code, but also disable 
existing code in order to remove the non-encryption security features and add a 
capability to the new iOS (GovtOS/SIF) so that passcodes can be electronically 
inputted into the device.108 Thus, creating a new software system designed to 
defeat Apple’s security features.109 However, Apple fails to fully address 
whether GovtOS/SIF will work only on this particular device or whether it 
requires some modification to work on the same iPhone model and/or all 
iPhones, and if so, how significant will the modification need to be in order for 
it to work on the same iPhone model and/or all iPhones. 
This failure to explain whether GovtOS/SIF will require any modification, 
and the extent of any such modification, is a potential flaw for Apple. As 
Mr. Neuenschwander implies, some modification to GovtOS/SIF would need to 
be made so that it can be used on other iPhones. He states, 
if Apple receives three orders a week similar to the one here from 
around the United States, the entire process described above—
writing, validating, executing, and then completely destroying the 
code—will have to happen three times every week, week in and week 
out. Each such commissioned operating system will need to be 
tailored to the specific combination of hardware and operating 
system running on the relevant device.110 [Emphasis added.] 
                                                          
 103 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 1. 
 104 Id. at 2. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 3. 
 108 Id. at 12. 
 109 Id. at 2, 13. 
 110 See Neuenschwander Declaration, supra note 35, at 10. 
20 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 27.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
To what extent does Apple have to tailor GovtOS/SIF to run on another relevant 
device? What is a relevant device? These are unknowns that must become 
known as they are critical to answering the question of whether Apple is being 
required to create a backdoor or something equivalent to a master key, i.e., is 
GovtOS/SIF two-steps away from a backdoor or master key? 
C. DOJ’s Opposition Position 
In its March 10, 2016 Opposition, the DOJ’s position remained the same: the 
Order is written to “produce a narrow, targeted piece of software capable of 
running on just one iPhone, in the security of Apple’s corporate HQs.”111 More 
importantly, the DOJ explains how a master key or backdoor cannot be created, 
something it failed to address in its Motion to Compel.  According to the DOJ, 
GovtOS/SIF can only be used on the one device, and is not a master key because: 
[t]he software ‘will be coded by Apple with a unique identifier of the 
phone so that the [software] would only load and execute on the [ ] 
DEVICE.’ . . . A ‘unique ID (ECID)’ associated with each physical 
iPhone is incorporated into the phone’s operating system. ‘Adding 
the ECID ‘personalizes’ the authorization for the requesting device.’ 
Apple has designed its phones so that every operating system must 
pair with the phone’s ECID. ([Declarations] describing how the 
Apple server ‘adds the ECID’ before it ‘signs’ the iOS to be used for 
the upgrade.) The operating system and ECID must correspond for 
the operating system to work. The ordered software [GovtOS/SIF] 
would rely upon the same limitation.112 
The DOJ also argues GovtOS/SIF could not be modified to run on other 
iPhones as GovtOS/SIF would not be released to the government or anyone else; 
and even “if the code were modified to run on a phone with a different ECID, it 
would lack a valid digital signature. Without that signature, the code would not 
run at all on any iOS phone with intact security.”113 To support its statement, the 
DOJ included Stacey Perino’s Declaration114 which outlines the DOJ’s technical 
explanation as to why GovtOS/SIF would only work on a specific device. Mr. 
Perino’s explanation relies heavily upon the ECID, a device’s unique ID. 
According to Mr. Perino, “[t]he ECID is a unique, device-specific identifier 
programmed in the phone hardware during manufacture. ECID [is defined] as 
‘a 64-bit identifier that’s unique to the processor in each iOS device. Used as 
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part of the personalization process, it’s not considered a secret.’”115 In its March 
15, 2016 Reply, Apple states that “Mr. Perino’s characterization of Apple’s 
process . . . is inaccurate.”116 However, before addressing Apple’s Reply, one 
must examine Mr. Perino’s explanation of Apple’s process. 
According to Mr. Perino, when a device requires an iOS update, it connects 
to an approved conduit (e.g., iTunes) and provides certain information to the 
conduit including the device’s ECID, a nonce117 and other cryptographic 
measurements. The conduit then forwards this information to an Apple server 
where it builds a software package, e.g. the iOS update, and digitally signs it 
using its private key. The public key is in the device’s Read Only Memory. The 
digital signature includes the ECID, the nonce and the cryptographic 
measurements originally received from the device. When the device receives the 
returned package (via the conduit), the device verifies the digital signature to 
ensure that the package is meant for that device (comparing the ECID, nonce 
and other cryptographic measurements sent to that received). Thus, the device is 
able to determine whether an older iOS system is being loaded and would not 
load the package if it were an older system.118 
Mr. Perino then discusses Apple’s code signing process of including the ECID 
into the digital signature to the device in issue. If the iOS update process occurs 
as described in the preceding paragraph, “the [GovtOS/]SIF could incorporate 
the ECID of the Subject Device, and then be signed by Apple . . . [I]f the ECID 
of the [GovtOS/]SIF were changed to the ECID of another device, the signature 
check would fail and an Apple device would not load the code.”119 Therefore, 
the GovtOS/SIF directed in the Order can run only on the specific device; and 
its creation, “tailored and signed with the unique identifier of the Subject Device, 
[the ECID] would not undermine the security of other iPhones that also require 
Apple-signed code, because each iPhone has its own unique identifier.”120 
Although Mr. Perino explains that the GovtOS/SIF will load on only one device, 
there appears to be least one issue with his explanation, and that is the ECID is 
not limited to a single, specific device. 
The ECID, the 64-bit identifier that is unique to the processor in each iOS 
device, referred to as the device’s unique ID in the Perino Declaration as well as 
in Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide 121 is not the same as the device’s unique ID 
(“UID”), the 256-bit key that is fused into the individual device during the 
manufacturing process (not known to Apple, its suppliers or even the 
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software/firmware within the device) and ultimately becoming entangled with 
the passcode.122 The confusion may have occurred because Apple uses the term 
unique ID with the ECID as well as unique ID (“UID”) to describe the 256-bit 
AES encryption key in its iOS9.0 Security Guide. Apple also uses the term 
“personalizes” (or “personalization”) with the term “ECID”123 which implies the 
ECID is unique/personal to the individual device. However, the ECID is unique 
to the processer in each iOS device, and thus would be unique to the processers 
within the same iPhone model.124 
D. Apple’s Reply to the DOJ’s Opposition 
In Apple’s Reply, it disputes the DOJ’s explanation as to why GovtOS/SIF 
will only run on the single device and argues GovtOS/SIF could be modified to 
run on other phones.125 Mr. Neuenschwander also explains why Mr. Perino’s 
iOS update explanation is inaccurate. 
Each time Apple releases a new operating system, that operating 
system is the same for every device of a given model.  The operating 
system then gets a personalized signature specific to each device. 
This personalization occurs as part of the installation process after 
the iOS is created. 
Once GovtOS[/SIF] is created, personalizing it to a new device 
becomes a simple process.  If Apple were forced to create 
GovtOS[/SIF] for installation on the device at issue in this case, it 
would likely take only minutes for Apple, or a malicious actor with 
sufficient access, to perform the necessary engineering work to 
install it on another device of the same model.126 [Emphasis added.] 
The critical question is then, how slight or significant the modification is such 
that GovtOS/SIF can be installed on another device. While Apple states it would 
only be minutes, thus implying little modification is required, it is unknown 
precisely what modifications are required. It is also unclear as to whether the 
modification is limited to specific models, such as “5Cs” or is broader and would 
include all model “5s.” 
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Apple uses phrases “equivalent to a master key,” “create a back door” or “in 
effect, create a back door.”127 Given the definition of master key,128 if some 
modification is required, Apple has not been ordered to create a master key for 
all its iPhones; however, Apple uses terms “equivalent to a master key,”129 
thereby allowing Apple to argue the negative effects of being ordered to create 
a master key, without having to meet a definition of master key. 
As to whether the DOJ is ordering Apple to create a backdoor, given the lack 
of a precise definition, it is more difficult to answer this question. If one accepts 
the general concept of what a backdoor means in the computer world and one 
assumes that the backdoor must be standard for all devices, one must then 
conclude that Apple is not being ordered to create a backdoor as it will require 
some level of modification in order for GovtOS/SIF to be installed on other 
devices. 
Because the terms are not defined in their respective documents, it cannot be 
determined whether Apple is truly required to create a master key (or something 
equivalent to one), a backdoor, or something two-steps away from a master key 
or backdoor. However, in future cases, one must closely examine Apple’s choice 
of terms/phrases as well as focus on how much of a modification is required, and 
its impact to what iPhone models. 
E. Is Apple Being Ordered to Hack its Customers? 
Initially, in its Message, Apple states, “[t]he government is asking Apple to 
hack our own users.”130 In its Motion to Compel, the DOJ subsequently denies 
Apple’s public position and argues the Order “does not require Apple to ‘hack 
[its] own users’”131 nor is it “a ‘hack’ to all of Apple’s encryption software.”132 
Then, in Apple’s Motion to Vacate and Reply, Apple modifies its public position 
of hacking its own customers by arguing the Government will have the ability 
to hack into iPhones once it has the ability to access the iPhone 5C used by one 
of the attackers through a court order.133 Apple also additionally argues that the 
court did not properly analyze N.Y. Telephone Co.’s factors to determine 
whether the AWA could be used to compel third parties (e.g. Apple) to hack into 
iPhones or whether this hacking would adversely affect its interests.134 
                                                          
 127 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 2-3. 
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In order to answer the question whether the Order requires Apple to hack 
iPhones or is being ordered to hack its customers, one must again know the 
definition of the term “hack” and the term “hacker.” Similar to the terms 
“backdoor” and “master key”, both parties fail to provide a definition for the 
term “hack.” Rather, they appear to argue their own nefarious understanding of 
such terms. 
Over time the terms “hacker” and “hack,” and their meanings have not only 
changed but have multiplied.135 According to Jessie Sheidlower, president of the 
American Dialect Society, the terms early references to machines “share a 
relatively benign sense of ‘working on’ a tech problem in a different, presumably 
more creative way than what’s outlined in an instruction manual.”136 It was not 
until the 1960s that the terms “hack” and “hacker” were incorporated into the 
vocabulary of computer enthusiasts.137 The Jargon File has eight definitions for 
the term “hacker,” and only one of the definitions (the last definition) has a 
nefarious/malicious intent, and that definition is “[deprecated] A malicious 
meddler who tries to discover sensitive information by poking around”138 
Interestingly, the first definition is “A person who enjoys exploring the details 
of programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to 
most users, who prefer to learn only the minimum necessary.’”139 
Like “hacker,” the term “hack” also has multiple definitions that also are not 
nefarious except for it being an abbreviated term for “hacker.”140 In spite of the 
mostly benign definitions, over time, most individuals have come to understand 
the term “hack” to mean malicious meddling. In addition, the use of adjectives 
are now associated with hackers, e.g., white hat hackers (free-spirited creation), 
black hat hackers (malicious meddling).141 However, in spite of the general 
acceptance of the terms’ negative inferences, computer enthusiasts still use the 
term very differently, at least according to Ben Yagoda of The New Yorker. For, 
“[e]ven as the mainstream usage of ‘hacker’ took on its darker connotation, the 
geeks [have] continued using it to mean what it always had: a righteous dude.”142 
In the DOJ–Apple dispute, Apple again focuses on the Government’s future, 
                                                          
phones, whether the cellphone company was “too far removed” from the matter, or whether 
hacking into the phone adversely affected the company’s interests.). 
 135 Ben Yagoda, A Short History of “Hack”, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/a-short-history-of-hack. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Hack, THE JARGON FILE, http://catb.org/jargon/html/H/hack.html (last visited Feb. 
7, 2018). 
 141 Yagoda, supra note 135. 
 142 Id. 
2019] Encryption: Privacy versus National Security 25 
hypothetical actions that would still be subject to judicial review. Next, even if 
one were to accept the nefarious inference of the term “hack” (or “hacker”), is 
one really a malicious meddler looking for sensitive information (or even 
someone creatively exploring the computer’s capabilities) when a court has 
ordered a search, based upon probable cause, and/or the owner of the iPhone has 
consented to the search as well as to Apple’s technical assistance? One would 
think not. Rather, Apple again appears to use terms without meeting their 
definitions, and still obtains the benefits of the terms’ negative inference. 
 
V. DID THE COURT EXCEED ITS JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
WHEN IT ISSUED THE ORDER PURSUANT TO THE ALL WRITS ACT? 
Apple argues the Order violates the Constitution as the court exceeded its 
constitutional authority and violated the separation of powers doctrine when it 
issued the Order pursuant to the AWA. Apple’s jurisdictional arguments include 
the applicability of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act143 
(“CALEA”)144 to the issue before the court, Congress’ and the Executive 
Branch’s decisions to not pass legislation mandating decryption, and the 
political question of the issue before the court. Each is an independent basis 
demonstrating a court’s overreach. The DOJ disagrees with Apple’s positions 
and argues the court was within its constitutional authority to issue the Order 
pursuant to the AWA. 
A. The Court’s Jurisdiction and Its Relationship to the AWA 
Establishing the Judicial Branch, Article III of the Constitution states, “[t]he 
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”145 The First Congress subsequently established the federal judicial 
system pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1789,146 which also included the original 
AWA. Today, the AWA states, “The Supreme Court and all courts established 
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their 
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”147 
While the statute is straight forward, each party has its own perspective as to the 
court’s jurisdictional authority to issue the Order pursuant to the AWA. 
                                                          
 143 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2015). 
 144 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 9. 
 145 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 146 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 147 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2015). 
26 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 27.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
However, before examining each party’s perspective, there are two important 
principles of the AWA as it relates to a court’s jurisdictional authority. 
The first fundamental principle of the AWA is that “it neither enlarges nor 
expands jurisdiction of the court; it may be invoked only to aid jurisdiction 
which the Court already has.”148 Thus, a court may not use the AWA to extend 
its authority into areas where it otherwise does not have jurisdiction.149 A second 
principle of the AWA is that it “is a residual source of authority [for courts] to 
issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. “Where a statute 
specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the 
All Writs Act, that is controlling.”150 When analyzing the court’s authority to 
issue an AWA order, rather than examining the court’s initial jurisdictional 
authority relied upon (i.e. the search warrant), perhaps it is more efficient to first 
ask whether there is a statute that specifically addresses the particular issue at 
hand. Then, if another statute (e.g., CALEA) is controlling, the court’s use of 
the AWA to issue the Order to Apple would not be authorized and no further 
legal analysis would be required. 
B. Is There a Statute that Specifically Addresses the Particular Issue Presented 
in the DOJ–Apple Dispute? 
Apple believes CALEA is a statute that specifically addresses the particular 
issue at hand because: 
Congress, through CALEA, specified when a company has an 
obligation to assist the government with decryption of 
communications, and made clear that a company has no obligation 
to do so where . . . the company does not retain a copy of the 
decryption key.  Congress . . . opted not to provide authority to 
compel companies like Apple to assist law enforcement with respect 
to data stored on a smartphone they designed and manufactured.151 
Not surprisingly, the DOJ’s position is CALEA does not “‘specifically 
address’—or even vaguely address—the duty of Apple to assist in extracting 
data from a passcode-locked cell phone in order to permit the government to 
execute a validly issued search warrant.”152 Again, polar positions which can be 
reduced to the following questions: What does CALEA apply to? Data in 
motion? Data at rest? If only to data in motion, what intercepted communications 
are to be decrypted? 
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The DOJ correctly argues that this case is about data at rest (i.e. stored data) 
and not the interception of data within a communication. CALEA relies upon 
definitions in the Wiretap Act,153 which applies to information acquired during 
the transmission of a communication and not to stored information, therefore, 
CALEA is inapplicable.154 The DOJ emphasizes CALEA requirements that 
telecommunications carriers retain the capability to comply with court orders for 
real-time interceptions (data in motion) and outlines what telecommunication 
carriers must do, in advance of court orders, to ensure their systems can isolate 
information to allow for the real-time interception of network 
communications.155 In this DOJ–Apple dispute, the FBI is not requiring 
assistance for the decryption of data in motion, but decryption of the device’s 
stored data. Thus, CALEA is inapplicable. 
In both its Motion to Vacate and Reply, Apple cites a statute that pertains to 
the interception of communications (data in motion) yet then concludes that 
Congress chose not to apply CALEA’s requirements to data in storage. 
However, Apple fails to provide any logical analysis as to how it reaches this 
conclusion. Apple simply makes general statements similar to the following: 
“CALEA defines the circumstances under which private companies must create 
systems to assist law enforcement in its investigatory efforts, as well as the 
circumstances where such providers are not and cannot be required to build 
programs and systems to enable law enforcement access.”156 This statement is 
accurate at least with regards to when private companies are required to assist 
law enforcement with the interception of communications, data in motion. 
Regarding the DOJ’s argument of CALEA’s applicability to the data in 
motion versus data at rest, Apple fails to address this argument in either its 
Motion to Vacate or its Reply. For instance, Apple cites to In re Order Requiring 
Apple Inc., to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant Issued by This Court 
where the Government raised the data in motion versus data at rest argument and 
lost on that issue.157 Apple simply references the case as legal support for a court 
finding the government’s use of the AWA to require Apple’s decryption 
assistance was improper.158 
Although Apple fails to reference this case for a court’s rejection of the data 
at rest argument, the court’s reasoning in rejecting the argument must be 
examined. The court wrote, 
The proposition that CALEA makes a distinction between data ‘at 
rest’ and ‘in motion’ is largely correct as far as it goes, but ultimately 
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misses the point. Even if Congress did not in any way regulate data 
‘at rest’ in CALEA, it plainly could, and did, enact such legislation 
elsewhere. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (requiring ‘[a] provider of 
wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing 
service, upon request of a governmental entity, [to] take all necessary 
steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending 
the issuance of a court or other process.’)159 
Interestingly, the court’s data at rest reference is to the Stored Communication 
Act160 (“SCA”), which outlines the responsibilities entities must comply with 
when preserving stored data. In addition, if the government wishes to access 
stored data, the SCA generally requires the government to obtain a search 
warrant.161 Thus, the court’s reasoning appears to be circular as the SCA does 
not address the issue of encrypted stored data or CALEA. If the SCA requires a 
search warrant in order to access stored data (assuming all other SCA 
requirements have been met),162 the question still remains whether it is 
permissible to use the AWA to require third party (i.e. Apple’s) assistance in 
accessing the encrypted stored data. 
Finally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, the Wire and Electronic Communications 
Interception and Interception of Oral Communications Act, commonly referred 
to as the Wiretap Act, provides guidance concerning the enforcement of 
CALEA. When one examines Section 2522 of the Wiretap Act, Enforcement of 
the CALEA, it references 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (Chapter 119, the Wiretap 
Act), a State statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (Chapter 206), use of pen registers or trap and trace 
devices,163 i.e., generally statutes pertaining to data in motion. The enforcement 
provision does not reference the SCA164 nor does the SCA reference CALEA. 
Thus, one may conclude that CALEA, with its own enforcement provision, does 
not implicate or apply to stored data. 
When examining Apple and the DOJ’s arguments, the DOJ has the stronger 
argument that CALEA is inapplicable to the Order issued pursuant to the AWA 
as CALEA applies to the interception of digital (and other) communications 
(data in motion) and not to stored data (data at rest). 
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C. The Court’s Underlying Authority to Issue the Order Pursuant the AWA 
The issue in the DOJ-Apple dispute highlights how the courts utilized the 
AWA to issue the Order. In the DOJ–Apple dispute, as in United States v. N.Y. 
Telephone Co.,165 the court’s underlying authority was based upon a probable 
cause search warrant.166 The DOJ consistently argues this same authority in its 
Motion to Compel and Opposition.167 Other cases where the court’s underlying 
authority to issue a valid AWA order based upon a probable cause search warrant 
include Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States,168 In re Application of the 
United States,169 In re Order XXX, Inc.,170 In re Application of the United States 
for Order Directing Access to Videotapes,171 and United States v. Hall.172 Thus, 
there is ample case law which supports the court’s authority to issue an order 
requiring third party assistance to effectuate and prevent the frustration of an 
order it had previously issued and was based upon jurisdiction it otherwise 
possessed. In other words, issuance of an order allows the government to execute 
a search warrant. 
In past cases where Apple was not a party to the litigation, Apple has 
responded to AWA orders issued “to facilitate the execution of search warrants 
on Apple devices running on earlier versions of iOS”173 which would have been 
to access unencrypted data in iPhones.174 Apple also acknowledges compliance 
with these past orders.175 This history shows Apple recognized a probable cause 
search warrant as a court’s authority to issue an AWA order. If one has accepted 
                                                          
 165 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
 166 Id. at 168-69. 
 167 Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 7-10; Opposition, supra note 13, at 8, 13. 
 168 Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1977) 
(finding that when the government sought a search warrant for a wiretap based on an FBI 
agent’s information of an illegal gambling business, there was sufficient probable cause). 
 169 In re Application of the United States America for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Comm. Serv. to Provide Tech. Ass. To Agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 128 
F.Supp.3d 478, 484 (D.P.R. 2015) (stating that even though the government had not sought 
a warrant, there was sufficient probable cause established with an affidavit by a DEA agent). 
 170 In re Order Requiring XXX, Inc., 14 Mag. 2258, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154743, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (ordering a company to attempt to unlock a cell phone because the 
government had established probable cause and obtained a search warrant for the phone). 
 171 In re Application of the United States for Order Directing Access to Videotapes, No. 
03-89, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15227, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2003) (finding that the 
government did not need a court order to review the surveillance footage of an apartment 
complex because there was no expectation of privacy and the order to force the complex to 
produce the footage is not burdensome since the agents can review the footage at the 
complex with the complex’s equipment). 
 172 United States v. Hall, 583 F.Supp. 717, 717 (E.D. Va. 1984). 
 173 Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 2; Opposition, supra note 13, at 6, 28. 
 174 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 2, 28-29; Neuenschwander Declaration, supra 
note 35, at 6. 
 175 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 28-29. 
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a search warrant as a basis for a court’s underlying authority to issue an order 
against a third party for technical assistance under the AWA, the issue becomes 
focused as to whether the court exceed its authority under the AWA as a court 
may not impose unreasonable burdens on Apple.176 
D.  Apple’s Other Jurisdictional Arguments 
Apple makes a number of other arguments challenging the court’s jurisdiction 
and alleging the court violated the separation of powers doctrine and crossed 
into legislating. These arguments include expanding sub rosa the scope of 
CALEA obligations to Apple through the Order; updating, repurposing and/or 
reinventing the statute; and imposing CALEA requirements upon it even when 
Congress chose not to update CALEA and the Executive Branch chose not to 
proceed with CALEA II, which would have mandated backdoors for encrypted 
communications.177 
Focusing again on CALEA, Apple argues that it does not meet the definition 
of a telecommunications provider, but rather meets the definition of an 
information service provider, and Congress excluded information service 
providers from CALEA’s requirements. In addition, CALEA prohibits the 
government from “dictat[ing] to providers of electronic communications 
services or manufactures of telecommunications equipment any specific 
equipment design or software configuration.”178 And, even if Apple was a 
covered telecommunication provider, which Apple does not concede, CALEA 
“does not require covered telecommunication carriers . . . to be responsible for 
‘decrypting, or ensuring the government’s ability to decrypt, any 
communication.”179 Whether Apple meets the definitions under CALEA is 
immaterial because CALEA is inapplicable to the specific issue of third party 
assistance for accessing stored, encrypted data. The Order was issued in 
accordance with the AWA based upon the underlying court’s authority to issue 
a probable cause search warrant and not pursuant to CALEA. As such, the focus 
of the Order’s validity and whether the court exceeded its authority should be 
based upon N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong analysis.180 
Apple also argues the court exceeded its authority, and improperly crossed 
into the role of legislating by repurposing and reinventing CALEA to meet the 
evolving needs of society. Apple further argues, only Congress “has authority 
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‘to update’ a ‘technologically antiquated’ statute ‘to address the new and rapidly 
evolving era of computer and cloud-stored, processed and produced data.’”181 
Like Apple’s CALEA definitions’ argument, Apple’s repurposing and 
reinventing a statute argument is simply misplaced. The AWA authorizes a court 
to “‘avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its duties, 
when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve 
the ends of justice entrusted to it.’ The Court has consistently applied the Act 
flexibility in conformity with these principles.”182 Thus, Congress has given the 
courts a source of procedural authority to issue auxiliary writs in order to achieve 
justice or to prevent the circumvention of justice. The underlying court’s 
authority in the DOJ–Apple dispute was not CALEA; it was the probable cause 
search warrant. The court was not attempting to update CALEA, and Apple’s 
insertion of CALEA in this argument simply confuses the issue. If the court 
exceeded its authority, it would be based upon N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong 
analysis,183 and not because it was attempting to update a statute that it did not 
rely upon to issue its order. 
Apple also argues the court lacks judicial authority as the Executive Branch 
abandoned CALEA II which would have mandated backdoors of encrypted 
communications.184 In addition, the combination of Congress leaving CALEA 
untouched185 with three recent legislative proposals, which would have 
affirmatively prohibited the government from forcing companies to compromise 
data security,186 indicate Congress has not yet made a decision “to act on this 
issue.”187 Both Apple and the DOJ cite Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstates Bank of Denver, (“Central Bank”)188 albeit for different purposes. 
The DOJ relies upon Central Bank as legal authority of the Court’s reluctance 
to rely upon failed legislative proposals to demonstrate Congress’ intent.189 The 
Court wrote, “failed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground 
on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute. Congressional inaction lacks 
persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be 
drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation 
already incorporated the offered change.’”190 In reviewing Central Bank, it is 
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important to consider the Court’s acknowledgement that its cases have not been 
entirely consistent on legislative inaction and intent. However, after 
acknowledging this inconsistency, the Court reiterated its position that the 
absence of corrective legislation “arguments deserve little weight in the 
interpretive process”191 as “‘[w]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the 
absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.’”192 Apple 
concedes “silence is sometimes a weak indicator of intent;”193 however, 
congressional inaction can be an indicator of intent “when Congress actively 
considers legislation to address a major policy issue, yet deliberately declines to 
enact it”194 or when congressional inaction occurs within “the context of an 
elaborate and comprehensive statutory scheme.”195 
Apple emphasizes “Congress has intentionally opted not to compel third 
parties’ assistance in retrieving stored information on devices. That Congress, 
confronted . . . with the contentious debate . . . among competing security and 
privacy interests, made this decision, [which] ‘indicates a deliberate 
congressional choice with which the court should not interfere.’”196 Apple’s 
argument is misplaced as it again relies upon CALEA and the requirements 
defined entities have regarding the interception of encrypted communications to 
conclude that “Congress has intentionally opted not to compel third parties’ 
assistance in retrieving”197 encrypted stored data. While Apple’s reliance of a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme may be applicable to the interception of 
encrypted communications, the Wiretap Act198 and CALEA; it does not follow 
that it applies to stored, encrypted data. Finally, Apple cites Bob Jones 
University v. United States,199 as legal authority to demonstrate congressional 
intent based upon congressional inaction. However, in Bob Jones University, the 
Court was examining the inference of congressional inaction as to whether 
Congress agreed with past published IRS opinions. In this case, there is no 
evidence to buttress an inference that Congress’ lack of action is in support of 
past court opinions concerning the use of AWA to require Apple’s technical 
assistance to aid the FBI in accessing stored, encrypted data. 
Apple’s final jurisdictional argument is whether “Apple should be compelled 
to create a back door to their own operating systems to assist law enforcement 
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is a political question, not a legal one.”200 Both parties cite Baker v. Carr201 and 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty202 to support and refute each other’s political question 
jurisdictional argument. Thus, one must ask when is an issue a political question 
and outside a court’s jurisdiction? 
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court provided the following six independent tests 
for answering this question: 
(1) [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack 
of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or (5) an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various department on one 
question.203 
Although the Vieth Court stated “[t]hese tests are probably listed in descending 
order of both importance and certainty,”204 the Baker Court stated ‘the 
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the 
action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a 
judicial determination are dominate considerations”205 for determining the 
existence of a political question.206 Thus, the DOJ’s statement that the political 
question doctrine, “applies not in every case raising policy considerations but 
only in cases that raise nothing but policy considerations, cases where there is a 
‘lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving’ the 
issue”207 finds support with Baker (as well as both Diamond and Zivotosky v. 
Clinton208). 
Apple’s arguments are misplaced regarding the lack of finality of action by 
political departments and that an initial policy decision has not been made. The 
Supreme Court had held that a search warrant is required to search a 
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smartphone.209 Accordingly, the AWA authorizes the use of a writ to require 
assistance from a third party to ensure the search warrant can be properly 
executed. The issue before the court is not a political question but whether the 
court appropriately used the AWA to issue the required technical assistance as 
articulated in N.Y. Telephone Co.210 
VI. DID THE COURT APPROPRIATELY USE THE AWA WHEN IT 
ORDERED APPLE TO PROVIDE THE MANDATED TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE? 
Case law has been recognized and accepted that courts may utilize the AWA 
“to provide [courts] the instruments necessary to perform their duty, assuming 
those instruments are ‘agreeable’ to the usages and principles of law.”211 In 
examining both parties court-filed documents, each party agrees that a court may 
utilize the AWA to require assistance from a third party not subject to the 
litigation, and a probable cause search warrant could be the court’s underlying 
authority to issue the order. The parties differ on whether it was appropriate for 
the court to issue this Order via the AWA, requiring the described technical 
assistance from Apple. 
The DOJ argues the court properly utilized the AWA and all necessary 
requirements under the AWA have been met. Apple disagrees, arguing all 
necessary requirements under the AWA have not been met. In examining 
whether the use of the AWA was agreeable to the usages and principles of law, 
one must turn to N.Y. Telephone Co., the case which is “the acme of such 
litigation and the standard by which such procedures are now judged”212 In N.Y. 
Telephone Co., the Court concluded a court has the authority to use the AWA to 
require assistance from one non-party to the litigation; however, the Court also 
recognized a court’s authority is limited as it may not impose unreasonable 
burdens upon the third party.213 The Court outlined a three-prong test for future 
courts to consider when determining whether an order is reasonable. Applying 
N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong test to Apple, the issues are the following: “(1) 
How far removed is Apple from the underlying controversy? (2) How 
burdensome or unreasonable is the Order? (3) How necessary is Apple’s 
assistance?”214 
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Unfortunately, the N.Y. Telephone Co. Court combined the articulated factors 
with the facts of the case (as opposed to establishing elements to consider) to 
conclude the order was within the lower court’s authority. Apple is correct that 
the government fails to cite one case directly on point to the required assistance 
described in this particular Order;215 however, this fact alone is not dispositive. 
The fact that a court has been presented a request for technical assistance that 
has never been previously addressed does not prevent the court from deciding 
whether the use of the AWA was appropriate. This was seen in United States v. 
Hall where the district court had to determine whether it was appropriate to issue 
an order, pursuant to the AWA, requiring a bank to produce the credit card 
records of the girlfriend of a fugitive.216 At that time, the closest parallel cases 
pertained to the installation of telephone pen registers.217 Despite the existence 
of a case with analogous facts, the Hall court still concluded that all AWA 
requirements had been met, and it had the authority to issue the AWA order 
requiring the bank to provide the credit card records. 
In challenging the court’s Order, Apple argues it gives the Government 
unlimited power, stating, “what is to stop the government from demanding that 
Apple write code to turn on the microphone in aid of government surveillance, 
activate the video camera, surreptitiously record conversations, or turn on 
location services to track the phone’s user? Nothing.”218 Apple adds the DOJ’s 
interpretation of the AWA is unlimited, with no boundaries,219 and its 
interpretation would permit it 
to force citizens to do all manner of things ‘necessary’ to assist it in 
enforcing the laws, like compelling a pharmaceutical company 
against its will to produce drugs needed to carry out a lethal injection 
in furtherance of a lawfully issued death warrant, or requiring a 
journalist to plant a false story in order to help lure out a fugitive, or 
forcing a software company to insert malicious code in its auto-
update process that makes it easier for the government to conduct 
court-ordered surveillance.220 
The DOJ correctly notes that Apple is providing hypotheticals, and courts do not 
address hypotheticals; they address concrete disputes.221 In addition, all future 
requests for assistance via the AWA would be subject to a court’s review, and 
third parties would be given an opportunity to object to the court’s authority as 
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was done in this case and in the cases cited. The future hypothetical cases would 
need to cite the court’s underlying jurisdictional authority (e.g. Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 41) in order to avail itself of the AWA, and 
demonstrate how N.Y. Telephone Co.’s three-prong test has been met. As to 
Apple’s hypotheticals, if they do occur, they will be resolved in court at the time 
those facts present themselves. 
A. How Far Removed Is Apple From the Underlying Controversy? 
Under the three-prong test, if Apple is too far removed from the underlying 
controversy, then the court has exceeded its authority to issue the Order pursuant 
to the AWA.222 Unfortunately, N.Y. Telephone Co. did not provide specific 
elements to consider when analyzing whether a third party is too far removed 
from the controversy. The Court simply explained why the telephone company 
was not too far removed. Specifically, 
[T]here was probable cause to believe that the Company’s facilities 
were being employed to facilitate a criminal enterprise on a 
continuing basis. For the Company, with this knowledge, to refuse to 
supply the meager assistance required by the FBI in its efforts to put 
an end to this venture threatened obstruction of an investigation 
which would determine whether the Company’s facilities were being 
lawfully used.  Moreover, it can hardly be contended that the 
Company, a highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the 
public, had a substantial interest in not providing assistance.223 
The DOJ provides several, varied reasons demonstrating how Apple is not too 
far removed, while Apple provides a list of reasons as to why it is too far 
removed from the controversy. In examining the DOJ’s argument, one must 
remember there was probable cause to believe the device contained encrypted 
data related to the underlying terrorist event.224 In its motions, the DOJ focuses 
on the close relationship between Apple and its iPhones. The DOJ argued that: 
(1) Apple designed, manufactured and sold the device; 
(2) Apple is the creator and owner of the software operating system, 
marketed under the name “iOS,” within the device; 
(3) Apple designed the encryption and non-encryption features 
within the device; 
(4) Apple designed the device such that only Apple signed software 
can run on the device and its operating system which prevents the 
FBI from using another type of software on the device (to recover 
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data or test passcodes); 
(5) Apple does not sell its operating system but only licenses it and 
the licensing agreement prohibits the user from transferring any 
ownership of the operating system; 
(6) Apple restricts access to its software source code; 
(7) Only Apple can update the device; 
(8) Apple has the ability with older operating systems to obtain the 
unencrypted file content from iPhones without the passcode, and 
routinely did so when a search warrant accompanied an AWA Order; 
(9) Apple has the ability to modify the software to accomplish what 
the FBI has requested and what the court has ordered; 
(10) Apple has the technical capability to assist the government given 
the encryption and security features were designed by Apple, 
implemented by Apple, and routinely updated by Apple through its 
cryptographic signature of iOS patches and updates; 
(11) Apple has not denied it has the technical capability to assist the 
Government; and 
(12) Only Apple can provide the assistance.225 
Thus, when one considers all these factors identified by the DOJ, Apple is not 
far removed from the controversy. 
Strongly disagreeing with the DOJ and arguing it was too far removed from 
the controversy, Apple focuses on distinguishing itself from N.Y. Telephone Co. 
More specifically, 
(1) Apple is a private company; 
(2) Apple does not own the device; 
(3) Apple has no connection to the encrypted data contained within 
the device; 
(4) Apple has no connection to the events leading up to the 
investigation, versus N.Y. Telephone Co. where the company’s phone 
lines were being used to commit a crime; 
(5) Apple is not a highly regulated telecommunication agency with a 
duty to serve the public; 
(6) Apply is not a monopoly essential to communications; 
(7) Apple is a private company that believes encryption is crucial to 
protecting the security and privacy of its devices; 
(8) Apple’s encryption and non-encryption security features are 
recommended industry standards which are followed not only by 
Apple, but by other private companies; 
(9) Even though Apple designed, manufactured and sold the device 
as well as wrote and owns the software and iOS, this is insufficient 
to establish the connection mandated by N.Y. Telephone Co. for the 
AWA does not allow the government to compel a manufacture 
                                                          
 225 Id. at 17. 
38 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 27.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
simply because a commercial item is introduced into commerce;226  
and “Apple is no more connected to this phone than General Motors 
is to a company car used by a fraudster on his daily commute.”227 
Although Apple argues it is not a highly regulated utility company with a duty 
to serve the public, AWA cases are not limited to regulated public utility entities; 
private companies have also been ordered to provide assistance to the 
Government. For instance, in United States v. Hall, an order against a bank for 
bank records was issued,228 and In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing 
X to Provide Access to Videotapes there was an order against an apartment 
complex to provide the government its videotapes.229 The AWA cases requiring 
assistance from private or public companies recognized those entities’ duty to 
the public because they were “in a position to frustrate the implementation of a 
court order or the proper administration of justice.”230 Similarly, Apple’s 
“refusal to help law enforcement efforts, when it has the ability to do so, could 
materially”231 frustrate the court order (i.e. search warrant) and the proper 
administration of justice. 
While Apple is not a public utility monopoly in the traditional sense, Apple 
has monopolistic characteristics similar to public utilities, given its level of 
control over its products, especially after it has sold the product. Apple compares 
itself to General Motor’s (“GM”) distance from a GM automobile used by a 
criminal in his daily commute, with GM being too far removed from any 
crime.232 However, Apple’s argument is misplaced. With a probable cause 
search warrant, the FBI can place a tracker on the automobile or can search the 
automobile, and the FBI does not need a need a GM mechanic to assist with the 
placement of the tracker or with the search of the car. Furthermore, non-GM 
parts can be used on a GM automobile and non-GM mechanics may work on the 
automobile. Finally, Apple’s arguments that the DOJ’s licensing argument “is a 
total red herring” and “[a] licensing agreement no more connects Apple to the 
underlying events than a sale”233 are also misplaced as the licensing agreement 
prohibits anyone from selling the software to a third party, e.g. the FBI, where 
it could potentially circumvent iOS. Thus, Apple has limited the Government’s 
options, thereby creating a monopoly around its devices and its iOS. 
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In both its Motion to Vacate and Reply, Apple argued any criminal activity 
linked to the device at issue ended over two months ago when the terrorist was 
killed.234 While the court proceeding was more than two months later, that in 
and of itself is not dispositive. The FBI had probable cause to believe the device 
contained information about the terrorist attack.235 The encrypted data may have 
the contacts and resources used in the December 2015 attack and potential future 
attacks. The government should explore how the attack occurred in order to 
prevent future attacks, including identifying the steps followed and determining 
what steps could be implemented to prevent future attacks. Finally, some courts 
have decided AWA cases after the issue of the authorized use of the AWA had 
become moot as the AWA legal controversy was repetitive, but its resolution 
evaded judicial review.236 Apple’s argument that the date the terrorist was killed 
demonstrates that they are too removed from the controversy is misplaced. It is 
misplaced because at the time of Apple’s March 15, 2016 Reply, the device still 
contained the encrypted data, the FBI had probable cause to believe the device 
contained data relevant to the attack, the FBI still needed to examine the device, 
and the FBI was unable to access the encrypted data because of Apple’s security 
features. 
Given both party’s arguments, the DOJ has the stronger argument that Apple 
is not too far removed from the controversy, and the first prong of N.Y. 
Telephone Co. has been met. However, there are two other prongs which must 
be evaluated before one can conclude the court was authorized to use the AWA 
to order Apple to provide the technical assistance specified in the Order. 
B. Is the Order Requiring Apple’s Technical Assistance Burdensome or 
Unreasonable? 
If the Order is too burdensome or unreasonable for Apple, then the second 
prong, as articulated in N.Y. Telephone Co. is not met, and the court would have 
exceeded its authority under the AWA. Again, N.Y. Telephone Co. did not 
provide specific elements to consider when analyzing whether an order is 
unreasonable or burdensome for a third party. In N.Y. Telephone Co., the Court 
simply explained why the order was not burdensome or unreasonable as the 
order directed the telephone company be reimbursed at prevailing rates and the 
order required minimal effort from the telephone company.237 In United States 
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v. Hall, the District Court, modified this prong providing “the order must not 
adversely affect the basic interests of the third party or impose an undue 
burden.”238 Apple emphasizes Hall to support its argument that the Order is 
contrary to Apple’s business interests in protecting the security and privacy of 
its products.239 
There are cases which limit a court’s use of the AWA where the non-litigant 
entity bore non-reimbursable costs. One such case is PA Bureau of Correction 
v. U.S. Marshall Service, where the Court stated the AWA “does not authorize 
them [the courts] to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory 
procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate,”240 a statement Apple 
emphasizes.241 However, it is clear in PA Bureau of Correction, the State was 
attempting to transfer state prisoner transportation costs (so that prisoners could 
participate in federal litigation) to the federal government as “the ‘deluge of . . . 
civil rights actions’ calls for ‘creative’ use of federal judicial power to alleviate 
the drain on the States’ fiscs [finances] from the transport of inmates to and from 
federal courthouses.”242 While the Court concluded the use of the AWA was 
inappropriate under the particular facts of creative thinking to transfer costs, the 
Court also left open the door to the future possibility of the use of the AWA to 
transport state prisoners in cases involving serious security risks as these 
exceptional circumstances may permit the use of the AWA.243 
Another case where the use of the AWA is limited because of costs borne by 
a company is Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton,244 where the court states the 
AWA “does not give the district court a roving commission to order a party 
subject to an investigation to accept additional risks”245 This is another statement 
Apple also emphasizes.246 Plum Creek Lumber Co. is a case where OSHA was 
attempting to use the AWA to require a company to require its employees to 
wear special hats so that OSHA could conduct a non-criminal investigation. The 
hats impeded the employees which could have led to personal injuries and the 
costs of those injuries would have been fully borne by the company. While Plum 
Creek Lumbar Co. and PA Bureau of Correction limited the use of the AWA, 
the underlying cases are civil cases, with the transfer of costs to the employer or 
a third party. The DOJ correctly identifies criminal investigation cases where 
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courts have found the use of the AWA appropriate to require assistance from 
those not subject to a litigation so that a court’s jurisdiction would not be 
thwarted. The difficulty, as Apple correctly points out, is that none of these cases 
are directly on point to the facts of this particular DOJ–Apple dispute, although 
as previously discussed, this alone is not a dispositive determination. 
As to the reasonableness of the Order, the DOJ argues Apple is only required 
to assist the FBI and this assistance is not unreasonable as it is not a threat to its 
other products.247 Additionally, Apple writes code, whether it is new or a 
modification to its iOS, indicating writing code is not unreasonable or 
burdensome.248 Furthermore, Apple does not deny, but rather, concedes it has 
the technical ability to assist the FBI;249 and Apple does not argue its assistance 
would be too labor-intensive or time-intensive, rather it is concerned about the 
impact to its reputation and marketing strategy which are not direct costs.250 
In Apple’s Motion to Vacate, Apple addresses some of the DOJ’s arguments. 
However, it focuses on the creation of the new operating system adversely 
affecting its basic interests as a company. More specifically, GovtOS/SIF 
currently does not exist, Apple has no interest in creating it and would never 
create it as this new version of the iOS would be designed to defeat critical 
security features and would require significant resources from Apple as it will 
need to not only write new code, but disable existing code.251 Although hard to 
quantify, the expected expended resources include the following: 
(1) Six to ten engineers working full-time for two to four weeks; 
(2) Costs associated with the design, development and underlying 
documentation of the tool (GovtOS/SIF); 
(3) Costs associated with the development of detailed documentation 
instructing the FBI how to use GovtOS/SIF as well any tool used or 
developed by the FBI to interface with GovtOS/SIF thus allowing 
the FBI to input the passcodes electronically; 
(4) If GovtOS/SIF is not used in a secure Apple facility, Apple would 
need to develop procedures to encrypt, validate and input into the 
device communications from the FBI, and this process would need 
to be logged in and recorded in the event Apple’s methodology is 
ever questioned or challenged in court; 
(5) Once created, GovtOS/SIF would need to be evaluated through 
Apple’s quality assurance and security testing process.  Based upon 
experiences, problems are expected to occur, therefore the testing 
process would repeat; 
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(6) If GovtOS/SIF is destroyed (or erased/deleted) after employed on 
the device, GovtOS/SIF would need to be recreated for each new 
request which will multiply the burden placed upon Apple as other 
law enforcement agencies are desiring the same assistance, and costs 
are multiplied; and 
(7) Even if Apple did not destroy GovtOS/SIF, there would security 
costs associated with protecting GovtOS/SIF as it would be 
extremely desirable to criminals, terrorists and hackers.252 
Apple also attempts to distinguish itself from the cases relied upon by the 
DOJ, arguing it is not tasked to provide “meager assistance”253 and the cases 
cited by the DOJ deal with third party records which already exit, such as bank 
records254 or videotapes.255 Apple emphasizes the Order requires it to create 
entirely new intellectual property it believes is too dangerous to create, and this 
is vastly different from the cases the DOJ relies upon.256 Finally, Apple argues 
the public will bear the burden of the loss of security and privacy of its devices 
while criminals and terrorists will take advantage of other encrypted 
protocols.257 
In its Opposition, the DOJ provides substantial financial information about 
Apple, relying on Apple’s annual report and Apple’s status as a Fortune 500 
corporation. For example, Apple employs more than 100,000 full-time-
equivalent employees;;258 its 2015 annual income was over 200 billion dollars, 
which is more than the state of California’s budget; and its revenues exceed the 
nominal Gross Domestic Product of two-thirds of the world’s nations.259 One 
should also consider that Apple has become the first trillion dollar company,260 
with $243.7 billion cash on hand, the most of any Fortune 500 company.261 
Another way of trying to comprehend its value, as the first trillion dollar 
company, Apple has the combined net worth of 21 members of Forbes 2017 list 
of billionaires.262 
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In addition to considering Apple’s financial status, Apple is not fully 
responsible for the costs of the technical assistance, as Magistrate Judge Pym’s 
Order directed Apple to “advise the government of the reasonable cost of 
providing this service.”263 The DOJ also acknowledged the Government’s 
obligation to pay reasonable costs for Apple’s technical assistance.264 Thus, if 
the Government pays for reasonable costs associated with Apple’s technical 
assistance, a portion of Apple’s unreasonable and burdensome arguments are 
negated, which is perhaps one reason why Apple fails to comment on the 
reimbursement requirement in either its Motion to Vacate or Reply. Finally, 
future orders (although hypotheticals which should not be considered by the 
court) would be compensated in those future cases.265 As to costs associated with 
compliance and supplemental procedures, Apple has a centralized process 
dedicated to compliance with subpoenas266 and one would conclude Apple 
would have had to develop protocols for pre-iOS8 systems. While the protocols 
and procedures may need to be expanded, it is unknown how much the cost 
difference would be. 
In its Reply, Apple again focuses its argument on its position that it would 
never write the code for the functions required in the Order and that it finds it 
offensive to build GovtOS/SIF,267 as compared to N.Y. Telephone Co. which 
routinely used pen registers to detect fraud.268 The offensiveness aspect of 
creating GovtOS/SIF is not relevant to a reasonableness analysis given the 
subjective nature of the term. One could find hundreds of individuals/entities 
who find certain Government requests or actions offensive. That does not make 
the Government’s actions unauthorized. In addition, some may find Apple’s 
actions offensive as they are protecting the terrorist’s data over protecting 
national security, or so one could argue. Rather than focusing on offensive 
feelings, Apple should objectively articulate how the Order is a burden or is 
unreasonable for Apple. More specifically, what the impact to Apple’s products 
is, and whether Apple is being ordered to create a backdoor and/or a master key 
(or equivalent to a master key).269 This question could not be conclusively 
answered because it was unknown to what extent GovtOS/SIF code would need 
to be modified to work on other iPhones, be it the same iPhone model (e.g. 5Cs 
or 5s) or all iPhone models. Therefore, it is unknown whether this prong has 
been met, and the Declarations/testimony from each party will need to address 
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this particular point in future cases. 
C. How Necessary Is Apple’s Technical Assistance? 
N.Y. Telephone Co.’s third prong concerns how necessary was the telephone 
company’s assistance to the investigation.270 In N.Y. Telephone Co., the FBI 
could not install the pen registers without tipping off the targets to the 
investigation. The Court provides little guidance as to how this prong is or is not 
met as the Court simply wrote “the Court of Appeals recognized, that without 
the Company’s assistance there [wa]s no conceivable way in which the 
surveillance authorized by the District Court could have been successfully 
accomplished.”271 There was no further explanation as to what additional steps 
the FBI was required to take. 
The DOJ’s position is Apple’s assistance is “necessary to effectuate the 
warrant”272 in order to search a device critical to an ongoing terrorism 
investigation as the FBI has reason to believe the device contains critical 
communications prior to and around the time of the killings.  The Device may 
also contain data that has not yet been accessed through other methods as certain 
data resides only on the iPhone.273 Whether there are other methods available to 
the FBI, “both Apple and the FBI agreed that they were unable to identify any 
other methods – besides that which is now ordered by this Court – that are 
feasible for gaining access to the currently inaccessible data”274 Thus, Apple’s 
technical assistance is consistent with N.Y. Telephone Co.’s necessary 
requirement. 
Apple’s position is the DOJ must have absolutely no other possibility of 
accessing the encrypted data, and it must first exhaust all other possible avenues 
including seeking “technical assistance from other federal agencies with 
expertise in digital forensics”275 before receiving Apple’s assistance. Apple also 
argues the FBI prevented access to the encrypted data when it, without 
contacting Apple, changed the iCloud password associated with the terrorist’s 
account which then prevented the device from initiating an automatic iCloud 
backup; and had the FBI consulted with Apple before this change, it “could have 
obviated the need to unlock the phone and thus for the extraordinary order the 
government now seeks. Had the FBI consulted Apple first, this litigation may 
                                                          
 270 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 175. 
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 272 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 16. 
 273 Id. at 6. 
 274 Id. at 17. 
 275 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 30. 
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not have been necessary.”276 In effect, Apple argues the FBI created this 
situation. Thus, the DOJ has not demonstrated that Apple’s assistance was 
absolutely necessary to effectuating the warrant. 
In its Opposition, the DOJ focuses on the structure and security of Apple’s 
iOS as to how and why Apple’s assistance is necessary. The DOJ stresses the 
following: 
(1) Only Apple signed software can be loaded on the device. 
(2) Apple doubts the Government could disable the security features 
as it has “‘insufficient knowledge of Apple’s software and design 
protocols to be effective.’” 277 
(3) The device was found powered off, and subsequent testing 
revealed that once powered off, an iPhone will not back itself up to 
an iCloud account unless and until it has been unlocked with the 
passcode at least once. 
(4) Evidence suggests that the terrorist had changed his iCloud 
password on October 22, 2015 (shortly after the last backup of 
October 19, 2015) and that the auto-backup feature was disabled.  
Therefore, a forced backup of the device was never going to be 
successful. 
(5) The iCloud access is not a sufficient substitute for the search of 
the device as certain information (e.g. keyboard caches/recent 
keystrokes) is not backed up to the iCloud and resides only within 
the device. 
(6) Apple’s argument that N.Y. Telephone Co. requires “absolute 
necessity” is misplaced as N.Y. Telephone Co. rests on the language 
within the AWA statute itself which is “necessary or appropriate.278 
In its Reply, Apple argues the FBI should have consulted with other federal 
agencies before requiring Apple to assist with the investigation, and the FBI 
created this dilemma of inaccessibility to the encrypted data when the FBI 
changed the iCloud password. Thus, the DOJ has not met the “no conceivable 
way” language of N.Y. Telephone Co.279 In order to properly analyze the third 
prong, one must examine Apple’s argument that the FBI created this situation 
when it changed the iCloud account password.280 Like other aspects of this case, 
each party’s view of the iCloud account password change is different. 
                                                          
 276 Id. at 11. 
 277 Opposition, supra note 13, at 28. 
 278 Id. at 29-30; see also Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 3-4. 
 279 Reply, supra note 42, at 22. 
 280 Password and passcode are two distinct terms. The passcode is a component of the 
encryption key that protects the device itself. A password pertains to an Apple ID needed to 
access Apple’s Internet Services, such as iCloud.  Each iCloud account is associated with a 
specific Apple ID. The password necessary to access the iCloud is unrelated to the passcode 
needed for physical access to the device itself. See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 
7, 12, 38, 50; see also Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 3. 
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In its Motion to Compel, the DOJ initially stated the SBCDPH changed the 
iCloud account password in order to access the iCloud account, as neither the 
FBI nor SBCDPH knew the iCloud account password. However, in SSA 
Pluhar’s Supplemental Declaration, SBCDPH changed the iCloud account 
password under his direction.281 While the change of the password had the effect 
of eliminating the possibility of an auto-backup, the change of the iCloud 
password account is immaterial. According to the DOJ, the device was found 
powered off, and the device’s passcode needed to be entered at least once before 
an auto-backup to the iCloud account would occur. And, because no one knew 
the passcode, an auto-backup to the iCloud was never going to occur.282 
In its Motion to Vacate, Apple attacks the FBI’s credibility arguing the FBI 
initially blamed the SBCDPH, then in a press release corrected itself in “that it 
‘worked with’ the County [SBCDPH] to reset the password.”283 Apple then 
argues the FBI created this situation when it changed the password without 
checking with Apple or reading its security guide, and by changing the iCloud 
password, it foreclosed the possibility of the iPhone initiating an automatic 
iCloud backup of its data to a known Wi-Fi network which may have obviated 
the need to unlock the phone and this subsequent litigation.284 
Examining Apple’s terminology in its court filings, Apple does not state that 
its assistance to unlock the phone would not have been needed had the FBI 
consulted with it first; it simply states “this litigation may not have been 
necessary.”285 Apple’s discussion and focus on the change of the iCloud account 
password is, “a red herring” for a number of reasons. First, Apple does not deny 
that the device’s passcode would need to be entered at least once after the device 
was powered on in order for there to be an automatic backup to the iCloud 
account. Second, Apple’s public documents on this matter indicate a backup 
would not automatically occur because the device was found powered off, and 
was no longer set/linked to the iCloud backup. 
According to Apple’s iOS9.0 Security Guide, the passcode must be entered 
when the device has been restarted.286 Thus, the passcode would be required 
once the device was turned back on. Also, according to Apple, “iCloud Backup 
occurs only when the device is locked, connected to a power source and has Wi-
                                                          
 281 Pluhar Supplemental Declaration, supra note 12, at 3. 
 282 Opposition, supra note 13, at 28; see also id. at 2; Perino Declaration, supra note 39, 
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 283 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 11 n.21. 
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 286 See iOS9.0 Security Guide, supra note 45, at 7 (“The passcode […] is still required 
under the following circumstances: The device has just been turned on or restarted.”). 
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Fi access to the Internet.”287 However, the iCloud backup also has to be setup.288 
In this case, the iPhone had been powered off and the iCloud backup had not 
occurred since October 19, 2015, indicating it was disabled.289 Therefore, even 
with the powering on of the device, it would not automatically backup to the 
iCloud as the backup function would need to be reset which again requires the 
passcode. And, neither the FBI nor SBCDPH had the passcode. According to 
Apple’s public papers, it is unlikely changing the password impacted the iCloud 
account. Thus, Apple’s public documents support the DoJ/FBI, and one must 
remove how or why the iCloud password changed from the discussion. 
Apple also argues, based upon a statement from the San Bernardino Police 
Chief, there is no need for the FBI to search the device as it is simply speculating 
the device contains valuable information related to the incident.290 Apple’s 
reliance on a statement from someone outside the FBI is misplaced and itself is 
speculative. There is evidence found on the iCloud account associated with the 
device that indicates the subject communicated with victims the day they were 
killed on December 2, 2015; and because the backup ended on October 19, 2015, 
the iCloud account would not have these communications. There are also toll 
records that show the subject communicated with his wife, who committed the 
terrorist attack with him, from July through November 2015. However, these 
communications are not found in the backup iCloud data. Although what data is 
maintained only on the device appears to be a matter of disagreement between 
the two parties, it also appears the iCloud account does not contain all data 
maintained on the device.291 Thus, one may conclude the device contains critical 
data to the underlying terrorist event that is not located within the iCloud 
account. Finally, as to the FBI’s need to contact various federal agencies to 
determine whether a particular agency is able to access the encrypted data, there 
is nothing within N.Y. Telephone Co. which even implies this is a requirement. 
In examining this issue, one must focus on the language of the AWA statute, 
and it states “all courts . . . may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of 
their respective jurisdictions.”292 Contrary to Apple’s argument, the standard 
enunciated in the AWA does not require absolute necessity. However, here 
Apple’s assistance is necessary. Thus, focusing on the statute’s words, the DOJ 
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 288 How to back up your iPhone, iPad, and iPod touch, APPLE SUPPORT, 
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has a stronger argument as the statute only requires the writ be necessary for the 
court to avail itself of the AWA. In this case, the court’s search warrant issued 
would be completely thwarted if Apple does not assist the FBI, and this basis (to 
ensure a court’s jurisdiction is not completely thwarted) is consistent with case 
law. 
VI. DOES THE ORDER VIOLATE APPLE’S FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS? 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”293 When applying the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has acknowledged there is no constitutional 
difference between restricting one’s speech and compelling one’s speech.294 
Apple relies upon the First Amendment’s application to compelled speech to 
argue the Government is violating its First Amendment right to not speak by 
ordering it to write computer code requiring its cryptographic signature and 
unique ID. And, because the compelled speech is contrary to Apple’s views on 
privacy, it is viewpoint discrimination and requires the court’s highest level of 
scrutiny.295 The DOJ completely disagrees with Apple’s First Amendment 
argument. 
Before one can determine whether computer code is speech for First 
Amendment purposes, and if so, to what extent it is protected, one must first 
understand the basic concepts of computers and computer code. In support of its 
First Amendment argument, Apple cites Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley296. 
While Corley examines the First Amendment’s application to computer code, 
Corley (as well as its underlying district court cases) also provides fundamental 
concepts about computers and computer code (to include what is object code, 
what is source code, and the difference between the two) that is still applicable 
today and will prove helpful in determining whether code writing is speech for 
First Amendment purposes. 
At its most basic level, computers function with a series of on-and-off 
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 294 Riley v. National Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) (“There is certainly 
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switches, using two digits in a binary (base 2) number system – 0 (for off) and 1 
(for on). All data and instructions read by the computer must be reduced to the 
numerals 1 and 0. These strings of 0s and 1s are commonly referred to as object 
code. Fundamentally, a computer reads and translates everything into basic 
object code or a binary number set of bits (be it Base 64, ASCII, or Unicode). 
Computer language programs (JAVA, BASIC, C++, etc.) use symbols and 
syntax which is more commonly referred to as source code. In order for the 
computer to read and carry out the functions of the computer program language, 
the source code must be translated back into object code (strings of 0s and 1s). 
A compiler (internal to the computer) is the device/mechanism which translates 
the source code into object code (readable strings of 0s and 1s). A computer 
program’s language, the source code, may contain more 1s and 0s (thus 
appearing more like object code) or the source code may contain more written 
text instructions (thus appearing more like a language). However, no matter 
whether the source code has more language than numbers (or more numbers than 
language), the computer’s compiler must ultimately translate the source code 
into object code, strings of 0s and 1s.297 
When trying to determine whether object code is speech for First Amendment 
purposes, and what, if any First Amendment protections apply to it, the 
following outline may prove helpful. 
a. If the object code is not speech for First Amendment purposes, the 
analysis would end. 
b. If the object code is speech for First Amendment purposes, then 
one must determine what level of scrutiny the court should apply 
based upon a determination as to whether the compelled speech is 
content-based or content-neutral (or possibly commercial speech). 
c. If the object code combines speech and non-speech elements, then 
one must determine what level of scrutiny the court should apply?298 
In this particular case, the DOJ wants the court to take the position that 
computer code is not speech, and no further analysis is required. On the other 
hand, Apple wants the court to take the position that all computer code is speech 
and therefore, First Amendment protections do apply (and would argue the 
highest level of scrutiny is required). The case law which examines computer 
programs and computer code has issued decisions based upon the particular, 
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unique facts of the case before it. Therefore, when answering the question 
whether computer code is protected by the First Amendment, the answer is: “it 
depends on the facts.” One should also be mindful that the Supreme Court has 
not specifically addressed the question of whether computer code is protected 
under the First Amendment, and if so, to what extent? 
Apple is correct that there is some case law that protects computer code as 
speech under the First Amendment; however, Apple implies all computer code 
is protected speech, and this implication is incorrect. Apple cites Universal City 
Studios Inc. v. Corley 299 in support of its argument that computer code is 
protected, and Corley does protect computer code and computer programs; 
however, Corley does not protect all computer code under the First Amendment, 
and specifically rejected the argument that all computer code is protected under 
the First Amendment.300 
However, before one reviews Corley, one should examine the earlier case of 
Commodities Futures Trade Commission (“CFTC”) v. Vartuli301 (“Vartuli”) as 
it examined the possible First Amendment application to computer programs 
and computer code and was relied upon by the Corley Court. In Vartuli, the 
Defendants marketed and sold a computer program, Recurrence, to buyers 
guaranteeing profits in currency futures. In challenging various CFTC charges, 
Vartuli, a developer of Recurrence, claimed the requirement to register as a 
commodity trading advisor was a prior restraint of speech on Recurrence, and 
therefore required the court’s highest level of scrutiny.302 The court rejected this 
argument and concluded Recurrence, as marked and sold, was not speech 
protected by the First Amendment303 because the system was automatic, 
command-like. More specifically, the court wrote, 
The language at issue here was to be used in an entirely mechanical 
way, as though it were an audible command to a machine to start or 
to stop. ‘The point . . . [was] not to convey information or to assert 
values.’ It was to induce action without the intercession of the mind 
                                                          
 299 Id. at 449-50 (discussing how the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
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Amendment” and is thus entitled to its protections), aff’g sub. nom. Universal City Studios 
Inc. v. Reimerdes (Universal I), 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y 2000) and Universal City 
Studios Inc. v. Reimerdes (Universal II), 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 300 Id. at 451 (“Nevertheless, this momentary intercession of human action does not 
diminish the nonspeech component of code, nor render code entirely speech, like a blueprint 
or a recipe.”). 
 301 Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir. 2000) 
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or the will of the recipient. None of the reasons for which speech is 
thought to require protection above and beyond that accorded to non-
speech behavior—the pursuit of truth, the accommodation among 
interests, the achievement of social stability, the exposure and 
deterrence of abuses of authority, personal autonomy and personality 
development, or the functioning of a democracy—is implicated by 
the communications here in issue, and none counsels in favor of 
treating the Recurrence communications at issue as protected 
‘speech.’ . . . In other words, the fact that the system used words as 
triggers and a human being as a conduit, rather than programming 
commands as triggers and semiconductors as a conduit, appears to us 
to be irrelevant for purposes of this analysis.304 
While the Vartuli Court concluded, under its particular facts, the computer 
program Recurrence was not speech for First Amendment purposes, this did not 
mean all computer programs were not speech for First Amendment purposes.305 
And, in Corley, the Second Circuit was presented another opportunity to expand 
on its position of First Amendment application to computer programs and 
computer code. 
The issues presented in Corley concerned digital versatile disk (“DVD”) 
copyright and the constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s306 
(“DCMA’s”) anti-trafficking provisions. The district court had issued an 
injunction against Corley permanently preventing him from posting the movie 
decryption (computer) program, de-Content Scramble System (“de-CSS”),307 on 
its webpage or linking to another’s website. De-CSS had originally been posted 
only in object code, computer readable string of 0s and 1s. The Defendant 
appealed the district court’s injunction order under various constitutional 
arguments, to include the First Amendment.308 When analyzing the First 
Amendment issues, the Second Circuit examined them as follows: (1) Is 
computer object code speech? (2) Are computer programs speech? (3) What is 
the First Amendment’s scope of protection for computer object and source code? 
(4) What is the First Amendment’s scope of protection for the decryption code, 
de-CSS?309 
In examining the question as to whether computer object code is speech, the 
Corley Court first concluded that object code did not lose its constitutional 
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protection as speech simply because it is expressed in binary code.310 The court 
drew an analogy to mathematical formulae and musical scores, both written in a 
form of code or symbolic notations that are not understood by all; however, both 
are covered by the First Amendment.311 The court went on to say that if someone 
wrote a novel entirely in computer object code, the novel would be no different 
for constitutional purposes than if it had been written in English, and while a 
novel written in object code may only be read by a limited group of individuals, 
it would be no more incomprehensible than a novel written in Sanskrit.312 
Interestingly, the court acknowledged that a work of literature is unlikely to be 
written in a binary object code string as it is primarily the program language 
executed by a computer; however, it went on to say that “the ease with which a 
work is comprehended is irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. If computer 
code is distinguishable from conventional speech for First Amendment 
purposes, it is not because it is written in an obscure language.”313 In theory, the 
court’s statements are accurate. If a novel were entirely written in binary code, 
only computer programmers would be able to read the novel; however, would 
computer programmers really read War and Peace written in binary code? One 
would suspect the answer to be “no.” And, it is the code’s function, or use, which 
is significant to both the Vartuli and Corley Courts when determining what code 
is protected by the First Amendment. 
Appellant Corley had argued that all code should be protected in the same 
manner as an engineering blueprint or a recipe; however this position was 
rejected by the court.314 The court examined the computer program object code’s 
function which was a set of instructions to a computer either to perform a task 
or series of tasks when initiated by a click or series of clicks once a program is 
operational (or launched) to manipulate data that the user enters into the 
computer. Whether this object code that gives a computer instructions is speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment requires consideration of the scope 
of the Constitution’s protection of speech (content-based/content-neutral speech 
regulation, expressive activity/symbolic conduct, and non-speech and speech 
elements). The court concluded the “realities of what code is and what its normal 
functions are require a First Amendment analysis that treats code as combining 
non-speech and speech elements, i.e. functional and expressive elements.”315 
The court also noted that before it could examine the level of protection, one 
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must identify what part of the regulated activity is “sufficiently imbued with 
elements of communication to fall with the scope of the First Amendment.”316 
And once that speech component is identified, then one examines what level of 
scrutiny the court is to apply. 
When the court examined the scope of the Constitution’s protection of speech 
to object code, the Corley Court also acknowledged Vartuli, noting that it had 
considered two ways in which a programmer might be said to communicate 
through code: to the user of the computer program (in that case, Recurrence) 
which would not necessarily be protected, and to the computer which was never 
protected.317 Thus, if object code that tells a computer what to do is not speech 
for First Amendment purposes, then it logically follows that being required to 
write object code, as directed in the Order, would not be compelled speech for 
First Amendment purposes. Thus, Apple’s First Amendment argument (of 
compelled speech) is not supported by Corley and Vartuli because simply 
instructing a computer how to perform is not considered protected speech under 
the First Amendment. 
While the code to be written is not being distributed, remains internal to the 
device (basically a minicomputer)318 and simply tells the device/minicomputer 
how to function, Apple argues the expressive characteristics of code writing does 
satisfy elements of communication that warrant First Amendment protections. 
Apple also argues because the code to be written is cryptographically signed and 
contains a unique ID, these are indicia of speech requiring First Amendment 
protections. However, reading Corley and Vartuli, the signature and unique ID 
would be irrelevant to determining whether code writing is speech for First 
Amendment purposes. As to Apple’s argument that there are expressive 
elements associated with code writing as code writers write code differently, 
even if one were to accept this argument, just as all expressive conduct is not 
automatically protected by the First Amendment,319 not all expressive code 
writing should be protected by the First Amendment. 
Case law concerning the First Amendment provides guidance to determine 
whether written code is constitutionally protected. For example, does the 
computer code, GovtOS/SIF, convey information320 to a human being (which 
may be protected) as opposed to simply directing a device/minicomputer to 
function a particular way and is not protected?321 Does the code contain any 
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expressive content322 or an expressive purpose such as commentary, parody, 
news reporting, or criticism comprising of communicative messages by the 
author and/or operator that is not to the device/minicomputer?323 Can you 
determine the speakers’ purpose from the content of the communication?324 One 
should be able to conclude that there is no expressive speech component in the 
development of GovtOS/SIF or computer code requiring First Amendment 
protection under the current DOJ–Apple facts. The conveyance of information 
is simply instructions to the device/minicomputer to disable (or enable) certain 
functional capabilities. The code stays internal to Apple and internal to the 
device. There is no audience, no public, and no person receiving the alleged 
speech. There is no message as the only purpose of GovtOS/SIF is to tell the 
device/minicomputer what to do. The Government is only requiring a functional 
outcome of the code. Thus, one may logically conclude GovtOS/SIF is a purely 
functional component of the computer code to be written and is not speech. 
Therefore, it is outside First Amendment protections. 
VII. DOES THE ORDER IMPLICATE ANYONE’S FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be 
searched . . . or things to be seized.”325 There is a tremendous amount of case 
law concerning what is a constitutionally appropriate search and seizure, and 
one recent case addressing the search of a smartphone is Riley v. California.326 
The issue presented in Riley was whether a search of a smartphone seized 
incident to a lawful arrest was permitted under the Fourth Amendment. The 
Court ultimately concluded the search of the smartphone incident to a lawful 
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, and law enforcement is required to obtain 
a search warrant.327 
In the current DOJ–Apple dispute, the DOJ’s position is there are no Fourth 
Amendment issues raised under these particular facts as a court issued a probable 
cause search warrant (and the FBI obtained the owner’s (SBCDPH’s) consent to 
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search the device).328 The DOJ recognizes the Riley decision and stated the FBI 
complied with Riley and obtained the search warrant.329 
While Apple references Riley, its reference is not related to the search warrant 
requirement; rather its focus is on what a cell phone really is. “The term ‘cell 
phone’ is itself misleading shorthand . . . ‘these devices are in fact 
minicomputers’ that ‘could just as easily be called cameras, video players, 
rolodexes, calendars, tape records, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, 
or newspapers.’”330 Apple does not address a Fourth Amendment issue, either 
the terrorist’s or anyone else’s, albeit Apple would face a substantial hurdle if it 
tried, given the Court’s discussion in Alderman v. United States outlining the 
general rule “that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some 
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”331 The Supreme 
Court repeated the personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights, as well as noted 
its history of this recognition, in Rakas v. Illinois.332 Thus, the DOJ’s position 
that there are no Fourth Amendment issues is quite strong; Apple has no legal 
basis to assert anyone’s (other than its own) Fourth Amendment rights. 
VIII. DOES THE ORDER IMPLICATE ANYONE’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY? 
When reviewing Apple’s Motion to Vacate and Reply, one sees that Apple 
does not argue a specific individual’s right to privacy or its own public position 
that “privacy is a fundamental human right.”333 Instead, Apple focuses on the 
privacy interests of all iPhone users or the public’s privacy interests.334 Apple’s 
choice of terms is interesting, at least from an examination of constitutional 
protections. One must examine whose privacy interests are impacted. Does the 
Order’s impact violate the deceased’s right to privacy? A specific iPhone user, 
and if so, whose? all iPhone users’ right to privacy? the public’s right to privacy? 
Do any of these rise to the level of constitutional protections of a right to 
privacy? Is it appropriate for Apple to assert the constitutional rights of a specific 
individual, all iPhone users or the public? 
In order to answer these questions, one must first determine where the right 
to privacy originates from? the Constitution? the common law? both? How far 
                                                          
 328 Memorandum, supra note 70, at 2-3. 
 329 See id. at 2. 
 330 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 25. 
 331 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). 
 332 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). 
 333 Apple products are designed to protect your privacy, supra note 80. 
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does the right of privacy, whether from the Constitution or common law, extend? 
The answers to these questions will then answer the questions as to whose right 
to privacy is being impacted and who can assert a violation of that right to 
privacy. 
A. The Constitution and an Individual’s Right to Privacy 
Although the Constitution does not expressly confer a right to privacy, the 
Supreme Court has recognized an individual’s right to privacy even when it has 
not directly correlated to a specific enumerated right in the Bill of Rights. In 
Griswold v. Connecticut,335 the Supreme Court explained the right of privacy 
exists because “the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees 
create zones of privacy. We have had many controversies over these penumbral 
rights of ‘privacy and repose.’”336 As indicated, Griswold was not the first case 
articulating the concept of penumbras surrounding the Bill of Rights. In 
Olmstead v. United States, a case pertaining to the application of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments to telephone wiretapping without a warrant, Justice Holmes, 
dissenting, recognized penumbras emanating from or surrounding the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments.337 
The Supreme Court again recognized the penumbra concept in Whalen, 
Commissioner of Health v. Roe, when it examined the issue of one’s right to 
privacy versus a state’s interest in collecting prescription data.338 The Court 
acknowledged “[l]anguage in prior opinions . . . support . . . the view that some 
personal rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ are so ‘fundamental’ 
that an undefined penumbra may provide them with an independent source of 
constitutional protection.”339 While acknowledging the penumbra cases, the 
Court also expressed the opinion the right of privacy is founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty.340 And, although there is at least one 
Supreme Court Justice who does not recognize a constitutional right to 
                                                          
 335 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 
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informational privacy,341 there is ample case law to support the conclusion that 
individuals do have a constitutional right to privacy. However, for the deceased 
terrorist, he waived his privacy rights because SBCDPH had a written policy 
that the device could be searched at any time, and this policy was agreed to, in 
writing, when he accepted employment.342 
B. The Constitution and a Corporation’s Right to Privacy 
The Supreme Court supports the conclusion that corporations do not have a 
general right to privacy. In United States v. Morton Salt,343 the Court provided, 
“corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right 
to privacy”344 albeit, corporations do have some rights which incorporate 
portions of privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.345 The determining factor is: 
Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions 
denying corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or equality with 
individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . . . Certain ‘purely 
personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and other 
organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular 
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals. Whether 
or not a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to 
corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, 
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.346 
Thus, given Apple’s corporate identity and the history of the right to privacy, 
Apple does not have a general constitutional right to privacy. 
C. The Common Law and the Right to Privacy 
In examining the status of the common law right to privacy, the Restatement 
                                                          
 341 See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 169 (2011) (Thomas J., concurring in judgment) 
(citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010)) (Thomas J., concurring in part and 
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 342 Application, supra note 6, at 3 n.1; Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 5 n.4; 
Opposition, supra note 13, at 1. 
 343 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
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 345 First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779 n.14 (1978). 
 346 Id.; see also Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257, 284-85 (O’Conner J., dissenting in part). 
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of Law, Second, Torts, § 652A identifies the four violations to one’s right to 
privacy which are the following: 
(1) Intrusion Upon Another Person’s Seclusion: One who 
intentionally intrudes upon another’s solitude or seclusion (physical 
or otherwise) concerning his/her private matters if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.347 
(2) Appropriation of Another Person’s Name or Likeness: One who 
appropriates for his/her own use or benefit (not limited to a 
commercial benefit) another’s name or likeness.  While analogous to 
copyright, it is not limited by copyright laws.348 
(3) Publicity Given to Another Person’s Private Life: One who 
publicizes a matter pertaining to another’s private life, if that 
publicized matter is such that it would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person and is not a legitimate concern to the public.349 
(4) Publicity Placing Another Person in a False Light (this cause is 
not limited to defamation, but can be in addition to or separate from 
defamation): One who has publicized another person in such a 
manner that the false light of the other person would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and the person/one had knowledge 
or acted in disregard to the falsity in which the other person would 
be placed.350 
The Restatement of Law, Second, Torts, § 652G also identifies characteristics 
of the common law right to privacy which includes its personal nature (i.e. it is 
not assigned or maintained by another to include the individual’s family, unless 
their own privacy is invaded), nor does it survive the death of the individual (in 
the absence of a statute). In addition, corporations do not have a right to privacy, 
and therefore have no cause of action for any of the four violations of privacy, 
with a caveat that a corporation has limited protections regarding its name or 
identity (from a competition perspective).351 
Thus, one may conclude the deceased terrorist has no common law right to 
privacy in the device as any possible common law right to privacy ended upon 
his death, nor could a third party assert his right to privacy.352 The deceased 
terrorist had also waived his privacy rights with his employer, SBCDPH.353 
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 350 ID. § 652E. 
 351 ID. § 652G. 
 352 See CAL. CIV. CODE §3344.1 (2018) (California restricts the use of a deceased 
personality, name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness, in any manner, on in products or 
merchandise or goods, or for the purpose of advertising, or selling or promotion of such 
items unless specified approval is obtained.). 
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Given the common law right to privacy does not extend to corporations, Apple 
and Apple’s corporate users/customers would not have a common law right to 
privacy.354  If an iPhone is limited to business purposes only, that information 
theoretically belongs to the corporation, not the individual, and the corporation 
does not possess the common law right to privacy. 
Apple did raise the issue of the “privacy interests” of all other iPhone 
owners.355 Accepting that corporations do not have a common law right to 
privacy, the question then is whether Apple has standing to assert this cause of 
action on behalf of these individuals (assuming it can separate individuals from 
non-individuals). Given the restriction that the common law right to privacy is 
personal, one could conclude that Apple cannot assert the common law right to 
privacy on behalf of all other individual iPhone users. 
D. Standing to Assert a Constitutional Right to Privacy 
The Supreme Court recently articulated principles and requirements of 
federal-court jurisdiction and standing. In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l.,356 the Court 
recognized there is “‘[n]o principle more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper 
role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’”357 And, a corollary to that 
principle is the plaintiffs must establish they have standing to bring that case or 
controversy. Thus, could all other iPhone users who possess the personal right 
to privacy bring suit against the Government arguing the court’s order that Apple 
create GovtOS/SIF violates their constitutional right to privacy? In the 
alternative, could Apple assert the constitutional violation on behalf of all other 
individual iPhone users not party to the litigation? 
1. Standing and the Individual’s Right to Privacy 
According to Clapper and Spokeo Inc. v. Robins,358  based upon demonstrated 
facts, the plaintiffs have the burden of establishing standing by satisfying the 
following three elements: 
(a) Plaintiffs have suffered an injury-in-fact such that one has “suffered ‘an 
invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and 
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‘actual or imminent, not conjecture of hypothetical.’”359 The Court further 
explains the articulated qualifying phrases. For an injury (1) to be particularized, 
it “‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way;”360 (2) to be 
concrete, it “must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist”;361 and (3) to be 
imminent, although an elastic concept, “it cannot be stretched beyond its 
purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative . . . 
[rather] the injury is certainly impending.”362 The Court further explained that 
certainly impending does not include allegations of a possible future injury or a 
chain of speculative possibilities of an injury at some indefinite future time.363 
And, even if there was an objective, reasonable likelihood the injury would 
occur, this would still not satisfy the certainly impending requirement.364 
(b) The injury-in-fact “is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 
defendant.”365 
(c) The injury-in-fact “is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decree.”366 
Applying these three elements to all other iPhone users as potential plaintiffs, 
Apple faces a number of obstacles detrimental to its ability to meet standing 
requirements. First, potential plaintiffs could only be those that have a 
recognized personal right to privacy. Again, if an iPhone is limited to business 
purposes only, that data/information theoretically belongs to the corporation 
which does not possess the general (constitutional) personal right to privacy. So, 
“all other iPhone users” could not meet this first prong. Second, if the remaining 
iPhone users (those that can assert a general right to privacy) assume Apple’s 
argument of the impact of GovtOS/SIF to their iPhones, it would be difficult to 
establish a concrete injury-in-fact, a violation of their right to privacy to their 
specific devices. Apple’s arguments are built on a chain of events that are 
speculative, hypothetical and too remote, particularly as to whose iPhone 
becomes vulnerable to access, when the iPhone would be accessed, and who 
could inappropriately access the device. One cannot simply fear their iPhone 
would be inappropriately accessed or hacked at some unknown time in the future 
and consider that fear a violation of their right to privacy. In addition, one cannot 
establish standing by incurring expenses to prevent the inaccessible access or 
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hacking as one would be inflicting harm on oneself based on fears of a 
hypothetical future and unknown event.367 
There are data breach cases which address the issue of standing and a fear of 
identity theft. Cases where the plaintiffs have not met the standing requirements 
due to the speculative nature of the injury include Reilly v. Ceridian368 and Beck 
v. McDonald.369 Alternatively, there are other data breach cases where standing 
requirements have been met, such as, Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. v. Data 
Breach Litigation.370 Recent cases also recognize a circuit split is occurring 
regarding satisfaction of the standing requirements in data breach cases.371 
While there may be cases with different standing results, one thing they have in 
common is they set out the requirements to establish standing, and then focus on 
how a specific event is to occur and by whom. When these variables are 
unknown and indefinite, standing is not found. In the DOJ–Apple dispute, who 
will breach GovtOS/SIF, when will they breach it, how they will breach it, and 
what iPhones will be breached are all unknown, indefinite events. Thus, it would 
be difficult for those iPhone users who have the personal right to privacy to 
establish standing. 
2. Standing and Jus Tertii 
Some commentators have argued Apple should assert the constitutional rights 
of non-litigant iPhone users under the concept of jus tertii.372 Thus, one must ask 
whether Apple would have standing to assert a violation of all iPhone users’ 
constitutional right to privacy. This is in contrast to the general rule that “a 
litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, [sic] and cannot rest 
a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”373 However, as 
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the commentators have noted, the Court has permitted exceptions to the general 
rule374 and thus, the question must be analyzed. 
When examining the possible use of jus tertii, one must consider the 
following three principles: The first principle is that it is an exception to the 
general rule and the second is that courts are cautious in allowing others to 
vindicate the constitutional rights of non-litigants. Reasons include: Not all 
individuals who possess the constitutional rights want them asserted; non-
litigants will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is 
successful or not; and each individual is generally the best or most effective 
advocate and in the best position to assert his or her own rights.375 The third 
principle is “the limitations on a litigant’s assertion of jus tertii are not 
constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary ‘rule of self-restraint’ 
designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the 
applicable constitutional questions are ill[-]defined and speculative.”376 Thus, 
for the Court, a litigant’s limited ability to use jus tertii is a prudential rule that 
has not been enforced when the underlying justifications for the general rule are 
absent.377 
One such case is Barrows v. Jackson, where the Court provided one type of 
jus tertii outline to determine whether a seller of property, bound by a restrictive 
covenant to sell only to Caucasians, could assert the constitutional rights of 
potential buyers. The Court first questioned whether the damage award imposed 
on the seller for violating the restrictive covenant was state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes. After concluding that it was state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes,378 the Court’s second question was whether the state’s 
allowance for a damage award for failure to comply with a restrictive covenant 
deprived anyone of their constitutional rights. The Court specifically found that, 
solely based upon race, potential non-Caucasian buyers were unable to purchase 
land on the same terms as Caucasians.379 The Court then asked whether the seller 
could assert of the constitutional rights of the potential buyers, ultimately 
concluding the seller could.380 
In later jus tertii cases, the Court loses focus on the first two questions, and 
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primarily places its emphasis on question three, stating that it is appropriate for 
a litigant to assert the constitutional rights of a non-litigant when the following 
three elements are met: 
“[1] the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ thus giving him or her 
a ‘sufficiently concrete interest’ in the outcome of the issue in dispute.”381  Other 
courts have asked whether the litigant has suffered some injury-in-fact adequate 
to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirement.382 
[2] the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and 
[3] there must exist some hindrance to the third-party’s ability to protect his 
or her own interest.383 
In reviewing the later jus tertii cases, the Court does not consistently articulate 
the jus tertii elements; however, the substantive, consistent analysis of the 
elements occurs. Later jus tertii cases establish the elements as follows: 
(1) The litigant must have suffered some type of injury in fact to meet Article 
III requirements. For example, assessed monetary damages of $11,600 for 
violating the restrictive covenant of selling only to Caucasians;384 the NAACP’s 
loss of membership and financial aid if its membership list was released;385 
criminal conviction and imprisonment;386 loss of income;387 loss of sales, loss of 
liquor license and sanctions;388 and loss of integrity within the judicial process, 
including in the defendant’s trial.389 
(2) The litigant must have a close relationship with the third-party, e.g., an 
attorney-client relationship390 or doctor-patient relationship.391 However, this 
element is not limited to these special, confidential relationships. Other cases 
rely upon the litigant being an effective advocate or whether the litigant and non-
litigant are almost identical. For example, in Barrows, the litigant and seller of 
property was allowed to assert prospective buyers’ constitutional rights as the 
seller was the only effective advocate.392 In NAACP v. Alabama, the NAACP 
was permitted to assert its members’ Fourteenth Amendment rights as it and its 
members were basically identical.393 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the relationship was 
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not that of “a distributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate 
of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing 
so.”394 The Court also asked whether the non-litigant’s rights are diluted or 
adversely affected if their rights cannot be asserted by the litigant. For example, 
whether Eisenstadt was successful or not, one would not be able to purchase or 
obtain contraceptives.395 In Craig v. Boren,396 the relationship was not of vendor 
of alcohol and potential buyers, but that of an advocate for those seeking access 
to that vendor’s market.397 The Court also examined what impact there was to 
the non-litigant’s rights.398 Relying upon Eisenstadt, the Craig Court concluded 
that males between the ages of 18-20 would be materially impacted in their 
ability to purchase beer irrespective of whether the vendor was successful in the 
claim against the State.399 In Powers v. Ohio, the Court went back to the litigant 
being fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the constitutional right as 
the non-litigant.400 
(3)  Is there some hindrance to the ability of the third party to assert his own 
right? In Barrows, the Court simply concluded it would be impossible for buyers 
to assert their constitutional claim.401 In NAACP v. Alabama, while also 
impossible, the Court noted that if members asserted their claim, it nullified their 
constitutional right of association.402 Other impacts include a chilling effect and 
the publicity associated with being named in litigation concerning family 
planning matters falling within the doctor-patient relationship.403 In Powers, it 
was the probability and inability of the third-parties to assert their own rights 
because the potential jurors would face barriers in obtaining the underlying jury 
selection information and would face a significant economic burden if 
litigated.404 
Barrows and Power both provide guidance to determine whether it is 
appropriate for Apple to use the jus tertii exception and assert the constitutional 
rights of non-litigants. 
The first issue is whether Apple has suffered an injury-in-fact that would 
satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirements. Although Apple has no 
                                                          
240 (1959). 
 394 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972). 
 395 Id. at 464. 
 396 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976). 
 397 Id. 
 398 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976). 
 399 Craig, 429 U.S. at 196. 
 400 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991) (citing Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115). 
 401 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953). 
 402 Alabama, 357 U.S. at 459-60. 
 403 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117. 
 404 Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15. 
2019] Encryption: Privacy versus National Security 65 
common-law or general constitutional right to privacy, it could argue that its 
products would be less secure and would not be purchased, theoretically 
resulting in a loss of revenue. Granted, this may be speculative given that 
iPhones were purchased pre-iOS8 when data was not encrypted; however, 
assuming Apple is able to satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirements, 
then one may proceed to Barrows’ second question. 
The next issue is whether the court order, denies individual iPhone users their 
constitutional (general) right to privacy. It is doubtful that individual iPhone 
users who possess a general right to privacy could meet the standing 
requirements of any potential breach to their iPhones. Therefore, the 
Government’s actions do not deprive anyone of their constitutional right to 
privacy. And, if individual iPhones users are unable to establish a violation of 
their constitutional rights because of standing, Apple should not be able to assert 
a constitutional violation on their behalf. 
Additionally, it is clear there is no confidential relationship equivalent to a 
doctor-patient or attorney-client relationship between Apple and all individual 
iPhone users. In addition, Apple takes great pains in distancing itself from its 
customers in order to distance itself from the device at issue. However, Apple 
could argue it is acting as an advocate of all individual iPhone users, and Apple 
would be as effective in protecting their rights as they would be. However, do 
all individual iPhone users want Apple to assert their general right to privacy, or 
are there iPhone users who want Apple to assist the FBI without considering this 
issue as an impact on their right to privacy. There is a reasonable likelihood that 
there are iPhone users who want Apple to assist the FBI and do not see an impact 
to their right to privacy or consider it too speculative. 
There seems to be no chilling effect, embarrassment or nullification of one’s 
rights that would be of concern to a court with regards to a third-party’s ability 
to protect his or her own interest. Probably the most significant hindrance is cost 
of any litigation; however, given the number of amicus briefs that were filed, 
one could argue that third-party interests are already being protected. 
In sum, in spite of the commentators’ suggestion that Apple use the concept 
of jus tertii, Apple would have difficulty in establishing some of the required 
elements; thus it does not appear to be a realistic option.405 
 
                                                          
 405 See Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 493 U.S. 715, 720 (1990) (some commentators have 
argued that Apple should argue jus tertii and iPhone user’s Fourth Amendment rights; 
however, given the personal nature of the right, this author chose not to include it in the 
discussion of jus tertii, and limited the discussion to the constitutional right to privacy.); 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 
(1978); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 259-60; see also notes 327-334 with accompany text. 
66 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 27.2 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
IX. DOES THE COURT ORDER VIOLATE APPLE’S FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 
The Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” 406 In its Motion to Vacate, Apple argues 
the Government has violated its Fifth Amendment right to due process because 
it has been conscripted to provide services to the Government against its will.407 
Although not specifically raised as a violation of due process, Apple implies a 
due process violation when the DOJ filed its Application and obtained the Order 
without any notice or opportunity to be heard given to Apple.408 The DOJ 
disagrees with Apple’s arguments and/or implications. 
A. The DOJ’s Ex Parte Application 
In its Motion to Vacate, Apple implies the DOJ acted improperly “by 
invoking ‘terrorism’ and moving ex parte behind closed doors . . . cut[ting] off 
debate, and circumvent[ing] thoughtful analysis.”409 Apple also implies the court 
should not have signed the Order, writing “[w]ith no opposition or other 
perspectives to consider, the [c]ourt granted the government’s request and 
signed the government’s proposed order.” 410 Apple’s argument is rather 
interesting given many of the cases it cites are situations where the AWA order 
was obtained via an ex parte application.411 It is noted that one case required the 
AWA order be modified to provide the third-party a time period to object to the 
order; however, the order was issued via an ex parte application.412 Even in N.Y. 
Telephone Co., the court’s order was pursued via an ex parte application. 413 
Clearly, the DOJ’s actions are consistent with other AWA cases in terms of 
requesting an AWA order through an ex parte application, and the February 16, 
2016 Order gave Apple five business days to seek relief from the court if Apple 
believed complying with the Order would be unreasonably burdensome.414 
Thus, one may conclude the DOJ did not act improperly when it filed the ex 
parte application. 
                                                          
 406 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 407 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 34; Reply, supra note 42, at 25. 
 408 Motion to Vacate, supra note 18, at 11 n.22. 
 409 Id. at 2. 
 410 Id. at 12. 
 411 See id. at pp. i-iv. 
 412 See In re Order XXX, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154743, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 
2014). 
 413 United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co. 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977). 
 414 Order, supra note 28, at 3. 
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B. Did the Government Conscript Apple? 
In its Motion to Compel, the DOJ states it “does not seek to deny Apple its 
right to be heard,”415 and given Apple’s public position of litigation and its intent 
to not comply with the Order, it filed its “motion to provide Apple with the due 
process and adversarial testing it seeks.”416 Thus, one may conclude the DOJ not 
only wanted to ensure Apple was not denied due process, it wanted to 
affirmatively ensure that Apple was given due process. 
The DOJ’s perspective of due process is one of notice and opportunity to be 
heard, and given how Apple has legally challenged the DOJ, one must agree 
with the DOJ’s statement that “it is ludicrous to describe the government’s 
actions here as ‘arbitrary.’”417 The DOJ does address Apple’s substantive due 
process argument by stating, 
If Apple is asking for a Lochner-style holding that businesses have a 
substantive due process right against interference with its marketing 
strategy or against being asked to develop source code, that claim 
finds no support in any precedent let alone . . . [in] ‘the concept of 
ordered liberty’ or ‘this Nation’s history.’418 
Thus, according to the DOJ, Apple’s Fifth Amendment due process rights 
have not been violated. 
Apple’s substantive due process perspective is the denial of its liberty as the 
Government has “conscript[ed] a private party with an extraordinarily attenuated 
connection to the crime to do the government’s biding in a way that is statutorily 
unauthorized, highly burdensome, and contrary to the party’s core principles.”419 
Additionally, the Government has conscripted Apple by requiring it “to send 
individual citizens into a super-secure facility to write code for several weeks on 
behalf of the government on a mission that is contrary to the values of the 
company and these individuals.”420 And, this conscription is a significant threat 
to the independence and liberty of Apple and its employees,421 which violates 
Apple’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. 
From a notice due process perspective, one must conclude the DOJ has the 
stronger argument that Apple has received the required due process of notice 
and opportunity to be heard.  Which leads to the conscription/substantive due 
process argument. While most associate conscription with a military draft, 
conscription is defined as “forc[ing] someone to work as a member of a 
                                                          
 415 Motion to Compel, supra note 11, at 3. 
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group.”422 Therefore, one must ask whether Apple is being forced to work with 
the FBI? Apple is simply writing code for a brief period of time so that the FBI 
can access the device. Writing the code is done without the FBI’s involvement 
or supervision. In fact, Apple could simply turn over GovtOS/SIF to the FBI so 
that it can use GovtOS/SIF independently from Apple. Apple is either down-
playing or ignoring the court’s original jurisdictional authority, the probable 
cause search warrant, the historical authority behind the AWA, and how courts 
have recognized its authority throughout the AWA’s more than 215-plus years 
of legal history. Thus, the DOJ also has the stronger substantive due process 
argument. 
X.  HAS ANYTHING CHANGED SINCE MARCH OF 2016? 
The DOJ–Apple dispute remains unresolved since the February 16, 2016 
Order was vacated on March 29, 2016, when the DOJ’s filed notice to the court 
that it had been able to access the device.423 It is rather ironic that once the FBI 
had access to the encrypted data, Apple wanted the FBI to tell them how it was 
done. The FBI declined to do so.424 
On February 9, 2018, it came to light that Apple’s iOS9 iBoot source code 
was leaked and made publicly available, for a brief period of time.425 Apple’s 
responded that “the leak wouldn’t impact iPhone security for most users”426 
because iOS9.0 was three years old and had since been updated.427 Although the 
iOS system has been updated, it is unclear whether the iBoot source code has 
been changed within each system, or how damaging this leak is to Apple. Does 
one really expect Apple to concede the leak impacted the security of its devices? 
In February 2018, Forbes Magazine noted Cellebrite, a Government 
contractor, could break the encryption on all models of iPhones, from iOS5 to 
                                                          
 422 Conscript, WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIA UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (2d 1993). 
 423 Final Order, supra note 4, at 25. 
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iOS11.428 Both of these events could have put a dent in Apple’s arguments that 
assisting the Government would damage the security of its products and the 
privacy of its customers. However, Apple’s argument could be revived because 
Apple is continuously striving to protect its products, and could have developed 
additional protocols to further protect its products. 
In June 2018, Apple announced it would change its iPhone settings to prevent 
companies like Cellebrite from circumventing its password limitations. 
According to reports by Reuters, “[Apple] was aiming to protect all customers, 
especially in countries where phones are readily obtained by police or by 
criminals with extensive resources, and to head off further spread of the attack 
technique.”429 While Apple added that it does not design its security 
improvements to frustrate law enforcement,430 Apple’s actions demonstrate the 
circular cycle of encryption and security. Circumvention by law enforcement or 
other third parties, and updates to encryption and security prolongs the dispute 
between Apple and the DOJ. Thus, from a legal perspective, it would appear that 
little has changed. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Apple’s encryption and non-encryption security features and the FBI’s need 
to conduct a national security/law enforcement investigation is an issue that has 
yet to be resolved and still exists today.431 The 2016 DOJ–Apple dispute was 
contentious, with no compromise between the two parties. Throughout the 43-
day public legal dispute,432 it was difficult to determine what was truly required 
of Apple, whether it was legally appropriate, and who had the stronger legal 
position. This article was an attempt to examine, and answer these questions. In 
sum, the DOJ seems to have the stronger legal arguments in the following areas: 
(1)  The Government has not violated Apple’s Fifth Amendment due process 
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rights as Apple has been given notice and an opportunity to be heard; nor has 
the Government violated Apple’s substantive due process rights as Apple has 
not been denied its constitutional liberties. 
(2)  The Government has not violated Apple’s First Amendment rights as 
writing code that instructs a computer how to function is not speech under the 
First Amendment. 
(3)  The Government has not violated the Fourth Amendment as the FBI 
obtained a probable case search warrant and the owner of the device consented 
to the FBI’s search of the device. As to alleged violations of third-parties’ Fourth 
Amendment rights, as they are personal to the third-parties, Apple is not able to 
assert those rights on their behalf. 
(4)  Apple and corporate iPhone users do not have a common law or 
constitutional (general) right to privacy. 
(5)  Apple is not able to assert a common law right to privacy on behalf of 
other iPhone users who possess the right to privacy as it is personal to that 
individual. 
(6)  As to Apple asserting a violation of iPhone users’ constitutional right to 
privacy (or Fourth Amendment rights assuming one could overcome the 
personal nature of those rights) under the legal theory of jus tertii, it is unlikely 
Apple would be able to meet the requirements of jus tertii as the injury-in-fact 
to individual iPhones users is too speculative. 
(7)  The court did not exceed its jurisdictional authority when it issued the 
Order given the court’s underlying jurisdictional authority of the probable cause 
search warrant. 
(8)  CALEA is not a statute that directly addresses the issue before the court 
as CALEA applies to data in motion and not data at rest and is thus inapplicable. 
Given the court’s underlying jurisdictional authority and the AWA’s 215-plus 
years of history, the focus of the DOJ–Apple dispute centers on whether the 
court properly used the AWA when it issued the Order, and whether the court 
properly analyzed the three elements articulated in N.Y. Telephone Co. for 
requiring third party assistance. The DOJ has the stronger argument for two of 
those prongs (Apple is not too far removed and Apple’s assistance is necessary). 
The primary legal issue centers on the second prong and whether the Order is 
burdensome or unreasonable. This issue is directly tied to the question whether 
the Order requires Apple to create a backdoor, a master key, and/or something 
equivalent to a master key. Because neither party provides definitions and the 
Declarations lack clarity as to how significant the modification to GovtOS/SIF 
must be in order for it to work on other iPhones, it cannot be determined whether 
the Order is unreasonable or burdensome. In order to resolve this issue, 
additional information is required, to include an accepted definition of backdoor 
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and master key and the extent of the modifications to GovtOS/SIF such that it 
would work on other iPhones. 
It is clear the data encryption dispute is not going to go away, and the debate 
between national security and/or law enforcement investigations versus privacy 
and security of electronic devices has been, is, and will continue to be 
contentious. However, this author is of the opinion that it does not have to be 
polar positions in that one must completely give way to the other.  Law 
enforcement agencies and technology companies can, and must, work together 
to protect the privacy interests of individual iPhone users (and the security of 
iPhones) as well as protect national security and law enforcement interests. 
Further litigation and new laws do not always truly solve the underlying issue 
between two important but competing interests. In fact, sometimes they may 
even create new issues not foreseen, especially in the digital world where new 
technological developments are occurring at a speed most cannot comprehend. 
In order to move from one’s polar position, each party must understand and 
accept that if national security and law enforcement interests are not sufficiently 
protected, everyone will lose . . . it simply will be about how much one will lose, 
and when we will lose, both as individuals and as a society. At the same time, 
each party must also understand and accept that if privacy is also not sufficiently 
protected, everyone will also lose. This will become a question as to how much 
one will lose, as individuals and as a society. Truly accepting both positions as 
well as removing issues of distrust will lead to positive communication between 
the two entities, and will hopefully lead to a reasonable solution that both parties 
can accept. Is this possible? Yes. Is it likely? Who knows?  What can be said is 
that if the parties are relying on litigation or new laws to resolve this dispute, it 
is possible one party will be pleased with that outcome; however, it is also 
possible that neither party will be pleased. Thus, it truly is in both parties’ 
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